MOFCOM statement on China's rationale for negotiating FTAs
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A blog set up by the first-ever Chinese lawyer at the WTO secretariat on issues relating to china's trade policy, WTO issues, etc.
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自由贸易区建设——方兴未艾
The Booming Development of Free Trade Areas (FTAs)
自贸区战略由来:从构想到战略
Origin of Free Trade Area Strategy Conception to Strategy
自由贸易区定义:
所谓自由贸易区,是指两个或两个以上国家或地区通过签署协定,在WTO最惠国待遇基础上,相互进一步开放市场,分阶段取消绝大部分货物的关税和非关税壁垒,改善服务和投资的市场准入条件,从而形成的实现贸易和投资自由化的特定区域。
Definition of Free Trade Area
A FTA refers to a specific geographical area formed by the customs territories of two or more ries/regions that have signed agreements to further open up markets, phase out most of the tariffs and non-tariff barriers for goods and improve market access for trade in services and investment amongst the members on the basis of the WTO MFN treatment so as to realize trade and investment liberalization.
区域贸易安排数量(自贸区为主)
Number of Regional Trade Agreements (mainly FTAs)
自由贸易协定(FTA)
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
2000年11月25日,朱�基总理出席在新加坡举行的第四次中国—东盟领导人会议时,提出探讨建立中国—东盟自贸区可能性的建议,得到东盟国家积极响应。这是中国首次提出自贸区建设构想。
图为东盟各国地理位置和2000年与中国的双边经贸关系概况。
On November 25th, 2000, during the Fourth China-ASEAN Summit held in Singapore, Premier Zhu Rongji proposed to explore the possibility of establishing a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area which was responded positively by ASEAN ries. This is the first time that China proposed a FTA initiative.
The picture shows the geographic location of ASEAN ries and the general information on China-ASEAN bilateral trade in 2000.
2007年10月15日,在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上,胡锦涛总书记在向大会所作报告中提出“实施自由贸易区战略”。
图为中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会会场。
On October 15th, 2007, in the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao, the General Secretary, proposed the “Implementation of a FTA Strategy” in his report to the Congress.
The picture shows the venue of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
自贸区国际法依据:
1.《关贸总协定》第24条和乌拉圭回合《关于解释1994年 关贸总协定第24条的谅解》
2.《服务贸易总协定》第5条
3. 东京回合《差别的更优惠待遇、互惠以及发展中国家更充分参与》框架协议 (简称授权条款)
4.《关贸总协定》第25条(简称免责条款)
自贸区国内法依据:
《中华人民共和国对外贸易法》第5条:
“中华人民共和国根据平等互利的原则,促进和发展同其他国家和地区的贸易关系,缔结或者参加关税同盟协定、自由贸易区协定等区域经济贸易协定,参加区域经济组织。”
International Legal Basis for FTA
1. Article XXIV of the “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”(GATT) and “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV ”
2. Article V of the “General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS)
3. Tokyo Round, the “Agreement on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing ries” (also referred to as the Enabling Clause)
4. Article XXV of GATT (also referred to as the Waiver Clause)
Domestic Legal Basis for FTA
Article 5 of the “Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China”
The People's Republic of China shall promote and develop trade relations with other ries and regions,conclude or participate in customs union agreements, free trade agreements and other regional economic and trade agreements, and participate in regional economic organizations in the principle of equality and mutual benefit.
2004年11月19日, 胡锦涛主席和新西兰总理海伦・克拉克在亚太经合组织领导人会议期间共同宣布启动自由贸易协定谈判。
图为2001年海伦・克拉克访华时出席新西兰教育情况介绍会并作精彩演讲。
Chinese President Hu Jintao and New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark jointly announced the launching of negotiations on a free trade agreement during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting on November 19th, 2004.
The picture shows New Zealand Prime Ministrer Helen Clark made a keynote speech on education cooperation and exchange between China and New Zealand during her visit to China in 2001.
2004年7月6日,中国与海合会双方共同宣布启动中国—海湾合作委员会自由贸易区谈判。
图为海湾合作委员会6国(沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、科威特、卡塔尔、巴林、阿曼)会议现场。
China and GCC jointly announced the launching of negotiations on China-Gulf Cooperation Council FTA on July 6th, 2004.
The picture shows the venue of a meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council which has 6 member ries, namely, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman.
2006年9月7日,全国人大常委会委员长吴邦国在访问智利期间与智利总统米歇尔・巴切莱特共同宣布启动中智自贸区谈判。
图为2007年智利总统米歇尔・巴切莱特出席在圣地亚哥举行的首届中国拉美企业家高峰会。
Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committe of the National People’s Congress of China, and Chilean President Michelle Bachelet jointly announced the launching of China-Chile FTA negotiations on trade in services during his visit to Chile on September 7th, 2006.
The picture shows Chilean President Michelle Bachelet attended the first China-Latin America Business Summit in Santiago in 2007.
2005年4月5日,国务院总理温家宝访问巴基斯坦期间,双方启动自贸区谈判。
图为2005年6月15日,中国—巴基斯坦塔什库尔干边民互市开市。
China and Pakistan launched negotiations on free trade agreement during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan on April 5th, 2005.
The picture shows the opening of the Taxkorgan exchange marketplace on the frontiers between China and Pakistan on June 15th, 2005.
2006年8月,中新双方领导人宣布在中国—东盟自由贸易区基础上启动中国—新加坡双边自由贸易区谈判。
图为新加坡概况介绍。
In August 2006, Chinese and Singaporean leaders jointly announced that, the two sides, built on the basis of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, launched the China-Singapore bilateral FTA negotiations.
The picture shows the basic information of Singapore.
2004年11月29日,温家宝总理出席第八次中国—东盟领导人会议,双方签署了《中国—东盟全面经济合作框架协议货物贸易协议》。此后,双方又签署了《服务贸易协议》等。
图为老挝首都万象的第八次中国—东盟领导人会议现场。
The “Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN” was signed when Premier Wen Jiabao attended the Eighth China-ASEAN Summit on November 29th, 2004. After that, the two sides signed the “ Agreement on Trade in Services”.
The picture shows the venue of the 8th China-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, capital of Lao PDR.
2006年11月,商务部部长薄熙来与巴基斯坦商务部部长胡马云・阿赫塔尔・汗签署《中国—巴基斯坦自由贸易协定》。
图为2005年12月9日,中国与巴基斯坦签署自由贸易协定早期收获协议。
Minister of Ministry of Commerce Bo Xilai and his Pakistani erpart Humayun Akhtar Khan signed China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement in November 2006.
The picture shows the signing ceremony of the “Early Harvest Program of the Free Trade Agreement between China and Pakistan” on December 9th , 2005.
2005年11月18日,在韩国釜山APEC领导人非正式会议期间,中智双方签署《中国—智利自由贸易协定》。
图为亚太经合组织(APEC)第17届部长级会议在韩国釜山开幕。
China and Chile signed the China - Chile Free Trade Agreement during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Busan On November 18th, 2005.
The picture shows the opening ceremony of the 17th Ministerial Meeting of APEC in Busan, Republic of Korea.
2008年4月7日,在国务院总理温家宝和新西兰总理克拉克的见证下,商务部部长陈德铭与新西兰贸易部长菲尔・戈夫签署《中国—新西兰自由贸易协定》,这是我国和经合组织国家签署的第一个自贸协定。
图为2008年4月8日,陈德铭部长会见新西兰贸易部长菲尔・戈夫。
Minister of Commerce Chen Deming and New Zealand Trade Minister Phil Goff signed the “Free Trade Agreement between China and New Zealand” in the presence of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark on April 7th, 2008.
The picture shows that Minister Chen Deming met with his New Zealand erpart Phil Goff on April 8th, 2008.
2006年10月开始实施以货物贸易自由化为主的自贸协定
10年内分阶段取消关税,涵盖中国税目总数97.2%的产品,智利税目总数98.1%的产品
其中,立即取消关税的产品包括化工品、纺织品和服装、农产品、机电产品、车辆及零件、水产品、金属制品和矿产品等。
Began to implement the free trade agreement October 2006, mainly on the liberalization of trade in goods
Phase out tariffs covering 97.2% and 98.1% of China and Chile’s total tarifflines respectively
Of which, the tariffs of chemicals, textiles and clothing, agricultural products, machinery and electrical products, vehicles and spare parts, aquatic products, fabricated metal products and minerals products, etc. were subject to immediate elimination.
随着中国—东盟自贸区货物贸易协议的实施,中国对东盟国家的出口迅速增加。
图为中国—东盟博览会天津展台。
With the implementation of the Trade in Goods Agreement of China-ASEAN FTA, China’s exports to ASEAN ries witnessed tremendous growth.
The picture illustrates the Tianjin exhibition platform in China-ASEAN Expo.
2008年北京奥运会制作金牌和铜牌所用的金和铜原料全部从智利进口,享受了中国-智利自贸区零关税待遇。
图为北京奥运会金银铜牌。
All the gold and bronze raw materials used for the 2008 Beijing Olympics medals were imported Chile with zero tariff treatment under China-Chile Free Trade Agreement.
The picture shows the 2008 Beijing Olympic medals.
随着中国与东盟贸易往来的不断加大,榴莲、山竹等东盟10国的热带水果开始走俏国内市场。
图为广西南宁一水果店的老板在向顾客介绍东盟产热带水果。
With the growing trade between China and ASEAN ries, many tropical fruits these ries including durian and mangosteen become popular in the Chinese market.
The picture shows a fruit store owner introducing the tropic fruits originating ASEAN to customers in Nanning, Guangxi.
根据中国-新西兰自贸协定,新西兰将为中国武术教练、中医等职业提供工作许可。
上图为一些新西兰武术运动员在少林寺山门前合影留念。
下图为新西兰新开设的一家中医诊所。
According to the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, New Zealand provides work permits to Chinese Wushu Martial Arts coaches and Traditional Chinese Medicine(TCM)practitioners.
The picture above shows a group of New Zealand Wushu athletes posing in front of the Shaolin Temple.
The picture below shows a newly-opened Chinese holistic healthcare clinic in New Zealand.
My good friend Miguel Poiares Maduro has launched an innovative new LLM program in Lisbon. The faculty is drawn from leading authorities on different areas of law from around the world. While it is new, I strongly believe that it will soon become one of the leading programs in the world. Interested applicants can find more info on the program here. There are some scholarships available on a selective basis.
奥巴马或将改变美国政府多年来对中国出口产品“特保调查”的一贯态度和做法,若轮胎特保案一旦采取措施,极有可能引发美国乃至全球对中国进口产品的设限高潮
文 本刊记者 宋华安
日前,《法人》记者从接近中国商务部的人士获悉,美国钢铁工人联合会(USW)在4月20日向美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)提出申请,要求对从中国进口的轮胎进行特殊保障措施调查(以下简称“特保调查”),以达到限制进口中国轮胎的目的。这项标的价值达17亿美元的特保调查案,目前已引起中国商务部的高度关注。
业界人士表示,USW提起的该项“特保调查”是美国奥巴马政府针对中国产品实施特保条款调查的第一案。此调查美国产业一旦获胜,或将使美国对华实施 特保措施的势头高涨,更多的特保调查将接踵而来,同时也会引起其他WTO成员仿效,遏制和限制中国产品出口。在中国出口下滑趋势较为严峻的2009年,如 何积极应对美国的特保调查,以保障出口稳定回升,是政府和企业面临的重大课题。为此,《法人》记者采访了原中国商务部条法司和公平贸易局官员、现北京嘉润 道和律师事务所合伙人张涛律师。
本案的特殊意义
“目前中国是美国最大的轮胎出口国,2008年中国总计向美国出口4600万条轮胎。”张涛给《法人》记者提供了一组本案美国申请人——美国钢铁工 人联合会(USW)在申请书中所使用的数据。该数据显示,从2004~2008年,美国从中国进口的轮胎数量增长率为215%,美国轮胎产量下降25%。 美国汽车业的严重衰退,也给美国钢铁业以致命的打击。
USW认为中国出口到美国的轮胎已经严重影响了美国轮胎产业,其中包括美国工人的就业问题,以及可能导致越来越多的美国轮胎厂关闭。美国USW总裁Leo.W. Gerard 还公开宣称将利用美国贸易弥补法律“421条款”,即所谓的特保调查,来应对中国轮胎业的重压。
张涛表示,美国对中国的特保调查其实不是一个新鲜事物,从2002年起美国产业在布什总统任期内就对中国提起了6起特保调查。但这6起特保调查案均以失败告终,中国企业没有受到任何损害和损失。
本案的特殊意义在于:它可以被当成是检验奥巴马政府对“特保调查”的态度和做法乃至对中美贸易关系的“试金石”。
据业界人士表示,自2008年11月奥巴马上台执政美国以来,美国政府对特保的态度或许会有所改变。奥巴马的上台或应该引起中国企业的警觉。张涛认 为,长期以来,中国企业普遍对海外反倾销措施中的反倾销调查、反补贴比较熟悉和重视,但对“特保调查”一直不太关注。因为至今还没有一起因特保调查而遭受 损失的企业或行业。
特保调查
激增保障措施作为WTO允许成员方所采取的三大贸易救济措施之一(另外两个是反倾销和反补贴),是指当某一具体的产业由于受到突然大量增加的进口产 品的冲击,给进口国造成严重损害或严重损害威胁时,进口国政府可以实行临时性进口限制,主要通过增加关税、实施非关税措施(如数量限制)或两者并用来限制 进口,以达到国内产业免受国外产品冲击的目的。而特保与保障措施的一个重要区别就在于:保障措施针对的是正在进口的产品而实施的,其不考虑产品来源。也就 是说,只要是进口产品激增,不管是来自哪个成员方,进口方都可依据保障措施的有关条款对其启动保障措施的程序。这是WTO非歧视性原则在贸易救济中的具体 体现。而“特保条款”则是针对某特定成员国的进口来源。
据张涛介绍,1999年11月15日,中美签署了关于中国加入WTO的双边协议。该协议第13条规定,在中国加入WTO后的12年内,美国对中国产 品可以使用特殊保障措施机制。此后,这一条款成为中国加入WTO议定书第16条“特定产品过渡性保障机制”(即“特保条款”,据此采取的措施为“特保措施 ”)的内容。
该条款规定,WTO成员经事先确定的法律程序认定原产于中国的某项产品进口激增,并对其国内相关产业造成或威胁造成市场扰乱,则该成员可以对自中国 进口的此类产品采取限制措施。此外,《中国加入工作组报告》第245至260段对此特保条款又作了细化。这两部分规定构成了针对中国进口产品的特保条款机 制。一些WTO成员据此先后进行了相应的国内立法和实践。中国承诺允许其他WTO成员在入世(2001年12月入世)后12年内,可使用该条款来限制中国 进口产品。
同时,WTO议定书第16条还规定,如果一个WTO成员对某种中国进口产品采取了特保措施,并造成或威胁造成进入其市场的重大的贸易转移,该成员方可以针对该种中国进口产品采取特保措施。(HG: This is incorrect.)
美国特保“421条款”
张涛介绍,美国国会在2000年经由立法程序在《美国1974年贸易法》第四部分加入了第二章“进行贸易救济,避免美国市场遭受市场扰乱和贸易转移 ”的内容,其中包含第421节“针对市场扰乱采取的措施”、第422节“应对贸易转移的措施”和第423节“规则与条款的终止日期”。
依据“421条款”,在中国加入WTO后的12年内,若中国出口至美国的产品数量增加或者所依条件,对同类产品或直接竞争产品的美国国内产业造成或 威胁造成市场扰乱,美国总统可以在防止或补救市场扰乱必需的限度和时间内,针对中国产品加征关税或实施其他进口限制手段。由此,美国使用特保条款的国内立 法正式产生,这是美国为应对中国加入WTO而专门设计的防卫武器。
根据“421条款”,美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)可以自动或应申请启动特保措施调查,一般情况下ITC在60天内就做出决定。如果美国国际贸易委 员会裁决损害成立,将在20天内向总统及贸易代表办公室提交一份报告,贸易代表办公室在55天内向总统提出是否采取任何措施的建议。在此期间,贸易代表办 公室应举行听证会等,让进口商等利害关系方陈述意见,并可以与中国政府就此进行磋商。在收到贸易代表办公室提交的建议的15天之内,总统将公告采取具体措 施,但如果总统认为采取措施不符合国家经济利益或弊大于利,也可以不采取任何措施。
布什任期的6起特保案
据张涛介绍,从美国贸易法“421条款”生效至今,美国针对中国产品发起的特保措施案件(即“421调查”)已有6起。这6起特保调查案都发生在布什任职总统期间。
2002年8月19日,美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)应美国一家小规模的生产企业的申请,对原产于中国的椅座轴承致动器进行特保措施调查,也是首起 特保调查。而该产品中国在2001年对美国出口额仅为17万美元。02年10月18日,美国ITC裁定中国对美出口的椅座升降装置对美国相关产业构成了市 场扰乱,并建议实施配额限制。为此,中方与美方进行了磋商,到2003年1月17日,美国总统布什决定不采取救济措施,中美首起特保调查案以中国企业未受 损害而告终。
2002年11月28日,美国三家钢丝衣架生产企业向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的钢丝衣架立案进行特保措施调查。经过两个月时间的调 查,03年1月27日,ITC裁定中国对美国出口的钢丝衣架对美国相关产业构成了市场扰乱,并提出加征关税的救济建议。4月25日,美国总统布什否决了采 取救济措施的建议。
2003年特保调查案也发生了两起。6月5日,美国“保护美国维修市场用刹车盘、刹车鼓生产商联合会”向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的刹车 盘、刹车鼓立案进行特保措施调查。8月5日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的刹车盘和刹车鼓未对美国相关产业构成市场扰乱,并结束调查。30天后,美国有四家公 司向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的球墨铸铁管件立案进行特保措施调查。10月16日,ITC裁定中国对美国球墨铸铁管件出口不存在“紧急情势 ”;12月4日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的球墨铸铁管件对美国相关产业构成市场扰乱,为此,中方与美方进行了磋商。2004年3月3日,美国总统布什做出 了不采取救济措施的最终决定。
2004年至2005年各有一起特保调查案,其中04年的弹簧案张涛亲自参与过。04年1月6日,美国弹簧生产商协会向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产 于中国的床用内置弹簧组立案进行特保措施调查。经过短短2个多月的取证和应对调查,3月8日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的床用内置弹簧组未对美国相关产业构 成市场扰乱。2005年,根据421条款,美国国际贸易委员会对中国发起一起环状焊接管特保措施调查案,被ITC裁定构成市场扰乱。但在12月30日,美 国总统布什也最终否决了采取特保措施。
需警惕危害
尽管过去发生的6起特保调查没有对中国企业产生负面影响和实质损害,但中国出口企业切不可对此轻视。张涛分析认为,美国对中国发起的特保调查案具有三大明显的危害特征:
一是申诉和调查的时效速度非常快,从特保申请到特保措施的出台不超过半年。 “一旦ITC认定市场扰乱成立,美国总统可以很快就采取限制进口措施,在此情况下,中国企业很容易被打个措手不及。”张涛表示。而反倾销调查和反补贴调查 从立案到采取反倾销措施,一般都在12个月-18个月之间。
二是效果明显。如果美国总统决定采取特保措施,马上就会增加关税、实施非关税措施(如数量限制)或两者并用来限制进口,中国相关产业的出口量会立即受限或受到征税处罚。
第三个危害也是影响最大的危害,即容易引发“多米诺骨牌效应”。以美国“421条款”为代表的特保条款被称作是国际商务领域的“非典型肺炎”,它不 同于传统的贸易救济措施。如果某个WTO成员因特保调查成立而实施特保措施,其他WTO成员就可以“贸易转移”为由,对我国同一种出口产品实施连锁特保措 施,引发多米诺骨牌效应,进而使我国整体出口环境恶化。
美国产业界提起的6起特保调查案尽管都被否决,使其对中国产品实施“特保措施”的目的落空,但421条款的威胁却依然存在。奥巴马在去年美国的总统 竞选中曾批评布什政府在中国对美出口产品上屡次否决采取特保措施,并称特保调查应该被使用。今年2月份,美国在7870亿美元的经济振兴方案中曾有“购买 美国货”条款,虽因全球强烈舆论而将此条款作了软化处理,但不排除奥巴马政府在此后的具体政策执行过程中启用相关的贸易保护措施并对中国出口产生实质上的 损害影响。
张涛表示,中国承诺允许其他WTO成员在入世后12年内,其他WTO成员可以使用特保措施机制条款来限制中国进口产品。那么在12年大限即将结束的 2013年12月10日之前,特别是在目前全球经济不景气的情况下,美国(和其他国家)随时都可能利用421条款对我国出口产品实施进口限制措施,以保护 其本国企业利益。
不管当前这起轮胎特保调查案的结果如何,张涛认为中国企业和政府在这个特别敏感时期需要时刻警惕高度关注并积极应对,以避免由当前的轮胎特保调查案 引发连锁损害效应。张涛表示,目前美国产业和中国商务部都在紧密地观望轮胎特保案的走向,如果奥巴马政府有意通过此案改变美国政府在特保调查中的一贯做 法,中国应该怎么办?
根据自己参与应诉弹簧特保案的经验,张涛建议从以下5个方面来应对解决:一是涉案的中国相关企业答问卷,企业要积极配合起诉方的调查。二是商协会要 发挥起行业协会组织的作用,组织产业积极应诉,并同美国申请产业进行会谈协商,争取撤案。三是当行业发生特保调查案时,(行业协会、企业)要及时把相关信 息反馈给政府,由中国政府出面沟通,给美国政府足够的政治压力,同时营造一种强势的舆论。四是律师和经济法学专家共同对美国产业状况、中国进口及受损因果 关系等进行分析。比如深入判断美国是否遭受损害以及遭受损害的因果关系分析,研究美国轮胎产业是否因我国的出口而受损,若受损是否因进口我国轮胎激增造成 的,同时也要判断中国进口产品是否激增了,什么叫激增,如何界定激增等等,给政府提供积极翔实的数据支持。五是中国企业要通过多种方式获得美国进口商、下 游产业和最终用户(消费者)的支持,共同游说美国政府做出有利中国的结果。
张涛
北京嘉润道和律师事务所合伙人、律师,实战派反倾销法律专家,毕业于对外经济贸易大学,法律硕士。曾负责并参与了中国反倾销条例和规章的起草制定以 及中国反倾销调查制度的建设,受聘于中国商务部作为第三方参加WTO有关反倾销法律的争端解决,并代理中国商务部应对美国、欧盟和土耳其对华的纺织品特保 调查,具有丰富的反倾销特保调查案经验和美国337调查案经验。
From my friends at the ECIPE.
ECIPE has an internship programme (internships are salaried) and accepts every semester two candidates. Candidates should have a Master's degree in economics (international economics/trade economics), international political economy, European integration, or an equivalent discipline relevant for ECIPE's research profile. We are particularly looking for candidates with an excellent academic record and with a strong interest for a future career in academia, journalism, or policy making. Interns will participate in all of ECIPE's work and will undergo a training programme that is designed after their future career interests. Interns assist ECIPE scholars with research assistance and participate in research programmes. Interns should have excellent writing skills and should be fluent in English. The application should include:
• Letter of interest explaining why you would like to do an internship with ECIPE (1 page);
• CV with two academic references;
• MA/MSc dissertation in English (if your MA/MSc dissertation will be finished soon after the deadline, send your BA/BSc dissertation and a research outline of the MA/MSc dissertation).
Applications for the fall internships (starting September/October) should be sent to ECIPE (info@ecipe.org) no later than June 15.
On his reappointment as the WTO DG, Pascal Lamy outlined his plan for the WTO for the next 4 years. Below is his full speech, which emphases added by me.
Lamy: "Strengthening the WTO as the global trade body"
Director-General Pascal Lamy, in presenting to the General Council his vision for the WTO for the next four years, said on 29 April 2009 that "the WTO, as a living organism, should continue to improve its capacity to rapidly react to global challenges, as we are seeing in the current crisis, and to contribute to devising solutions to those challenges. The reinforcement of the multilateral trading system, in particular through the conclusion of the Doha Round, should be our guiding light. In the constellation of global governance, let's work together to see the WTO star shining ever brighter." His presentation was made in the context of the Director-General appointment process.
Statement by Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General
Mr Chairman,
Thank you very much for the opportunity to express my views and for providing an occasion for a dialogue with all members about the next four years. I hope that this process allows us to distance ourselves, albeit briefly, from our day-to-day concerns, and to look at the bigger picture.
As the poet Carl Sandburg once said: "a politician should have three hats. One for throwing into the ring, one for talking through and one for pulling rabbits out of if elected." The good news is that I have the hat. But the bad news is that we do not yet have a rabbit to pull out of the hat!
Jokes aside, I approach this exercise very much in the same spirit that I did in 2005; that is, remaining at the service of all WTO members and contributing to the strengthening of this Organization.
Let me start by reiterating my deep belief in the primary purpose of the WTO, which is to open trade for the benefit of all. The pursuit of openness, the guarantee of the most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory treatment by and among members, and a commitment to transparency in the conduct of its activities, remain our founding political values.
I remain convinced that the gradual opening of domestic markets to international trade, with justifiable exceptions or with adequate flexibilities, allows the achievement of sustainable development, raising people's welfare, reducing poverty, and fostering peace and stability.
But this does not mean that the benefits of rules-based trade opening accrue automatically to everyone. Hence the notion of a "Geneva consensus", which I enunciated in this same room in 2005. It is about trade opening but it is also about proper domestic and international policies, which help translate more open trade into real, increased and perceived benefits for our citizens.
We are living in a time of crisis. Its full social impact is still to come and it will inevitably create political pressures. And it is precisely now, when protectionist temptations abound, that the value of the multilateral trading system is all the more apparent to us. The GATT-WTO system of global trade rules patiently constructed over the last 60 years is first and foremost a provider of confidence for economic operators. And, as the crisis has shown, confidence is today the missing link to bring the world back onto a path of growth.
Therefore, our main objective for the years to come, as I see it, is to strengthen the role of the WTO as the global trade body. This means making the WTO more development-friendly, more "user-friendly", so that its benefits are felt by all, large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak.
Our core business is opening markets and designing trade rules. This is and will remain our unfinished business. Our task is far from over.
If we agree on this overall objective, which I believe we all do, how can we increase our chances of achieving it?
Based on the experience of the last four years and on the consultations I have had with many of you in recent weeks, there are four areas which, in my view, we should work to improve. These four areas are: negotiations; implementation; coherence; and outreach.
Delivering on the negotiations
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the WTO is more than its negotiations. But delivering on the negotiating mandate of the Doha Round remains the litmus test of our collective ability to strengthen the global trading system. This is why I believe that concluding the Doha Development Round is and should remain our number one priority.
Beyond the trade-offs required to conclude the Doha Round and also beyond the market access that it will bring, lies its hugely important systemic value. The biggest prize in the Doha Round is the certainty, predictability and stability it will bring to global trade. It is in a moment of crisis, such as the one we are witnessing today, that the value of this insurance policy increases.
The hard fact is that concluding the Doha Round is difficult precisely because its results will be meaningful: this Round is two or three times greater than previous ones, in terms of cuts and commitments. Also, this is a Round focused on benefits for developing countries — this is a true Development Round. If measured in terms of duties foregone, two-thirds of the potential benefits of tariff and subsidies cuts resulting from this Round will accrue to developing countries' exports.
What we need to do as of now is to reset the process at a political level, building on where we left it last year.
We have walked along the Doha Round path for seven years now and we are 80 per cent of the way there. We have done it together, with a bottom-up, inclusive process. A lot has been achieved — if you look back from where we started, there is a fairly long list of issues where views have converged. I believe the time is ripe to start taking the negotiations to the last phase; i.e. to run the last mile.
Looking beyond Doha, there are many new ideas floating around on potential areas for future work. Many of these have also come up in my consultations with you. Take climate change, where I am convinced that the first step should be a multilateral agreement embracing all major emitters that we all hope to see emerge at Copenhagen. Issues relating to food security, energy, labour, competition, investment or financial protectionism, however defined, are also in the air.
My own sense is that our capacity to project ourselves into the future depends on our capacity to make the present happen. These issues do not belong in the current agenda. Obviously nothing prevents us from thinking about the future but I believe serious work on any future topic should commence when the finish line of the Doha Round is firmly in sight.
Let me mention two areas which are part of our current mandate and which, in my view, deserve more of our attention: Regional Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin.
On RTAs, it is difficult to see why such deep concessions and commitments are undertaken today in the context of preferential agreements, without any consequences in the multilateral context. We all know this is a complex issue and that there are differences between RTAs aiming at deep regional integration and other free trade agreements. But, if we are serious about the prevalence of the Most-Favoured-Nation principle, we should collectively think about some way of gradually "multilateralising" concessions made in free trade agreements. Food for thought for Article XXIV negotiators.
On Rules of Origin, the proliferation of different regimes — regional, bilateral or even unilateral — needs, in my view, to be addressed head-on, in order to simplify the lives of trade and economic operators.
These two examples — RTAs and Rules of Origin — show that the WTO's current agenda is anything but old-fashioned. A lot of what we do today was already in the agenda of the Uruguay Round, even in the Tokyo Round to be more precise! But the fact is that they remain as relevant, if not more so, for economic operators today.
There are also a number of ideas being floated as far as the negotiating processes are concerned. Many have been explored in the Sutherland Report as well as in the Report of the Warwick Commission.
We currently operate within three constraints: decision-making by consensus, all negotiating items bundled into a single undertaking and a bottom-up negotiating process.
I do not think the "consensus about consensus" should be reopened. Taking decisions by consensus increases the legitimacy of agreements reached in an international forum, which is necessary and welcome, as the degree of legitimacy decreases with distance from domestic political processes.
The question then is how to build consensus. Resorting to the well-known concentric circles' approach is probably the only efficient method available. But it demands a rigorous transparency commitment by all: everyone must do his/her part. We must recognize that there is not yet enough transparency in the way we currently work — hence, there is room for improvement.
We also need to find ways to move faster to the centre of gravity on the negotiating topics, to increase efficiency. Here, in my view, there is something to be learnt from the negotiating processes of other international forums.
Sectoral and plurilateral agreements or concepts such as "critical mass" have already been tested. But again, I believe this should not be the focus of our work at this stage.
Improving implementation
The second area of future focus should be improving implementation of existing agreements. When one looks at the functions of the WTO, there is a striking contrast between the sophistication of the negotiations, the solidity of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the fragility of surveillance and transparency, which is nevertheless one of the pillars of the multilateral trading system.
The mandates for notifications and peer review are there, but in my view not enough attention and resources have been given to their implementation. A certain lack of overall vision and of analytical capacity handicaps the surveillance function of the WTO.
There are, however, some bright spots. Progress has been made in transparency in Regional Trade Agreements, for example. And with the monitoring of the measures taken in response to the crisis we have shown that we can collectively make a more muscular use of these mechanisms. But many committees register a poor record of notifications and — most importantly — of their quality and examination. As one of you told me the other day, we have been collectively a bit lazy in this field.
The challenge is how to improve this. We could make better use of technical assistance, focus more on the capacity of members to comply with their notification obligations and better prepare them for a more effective peer review. We could better operationalize Trade Policy Reviews. We could also redesign notification formats so that they become multipurpose. An improved surveillance process would surely increase trust in the system and avoid jamming the dispute settlement mechanism, through an "early warning" system.
As for dispute settlement, my sense is that overall it is working well. In addition to what is being negotiated in the DSU review process, there are some areas for improvement, such as reducing the administrative costs for the Secretariat — the length of submissions and annexes to be translated is one issue to be tackled — and addressing peaks of activity.
Compliance with dispute settlement decisions is also an area to be given attention. As is the participation of developing countries in dispute settlement, where I believe that a boost to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law would surely be welcome. And also how to make better and more frequent use of good offices, mediation and arbitration, procedures which are provided for in our existing rules.
Building on coherence
The third area I would alike to flag is how to ensure more coherence both internally and externally.
Starting with the Secretariat: my view is that, in spite of past progress, there remains a need to further de-compartmentalize divisions, improve internal communication, enhance mobility of staff, make use of task forces - such as the one we have for crisis monitoring - or establish pools of experts, for activities such as Trade Policy Reviews, technical assistance and accessions. We should also have more informal sessions and seminars with members, to look across areas covered by the WTO.
Externally, the WTO is one of the planets in the global governance galaxy and its know-how can be leveraged even more to tackle global governance challenges. The main ingredients of global governance are efficiency and legitimacy. The key to combine these two elements is coherence.
We have used our convening power to ensure a more coherent approach to different issues in the international trade and economic agenda. In the last four years we have strengthened the functioning of the explicit coherence mandate that the WTO has with the World Bank and with the International Monetary Fund. But we have also worked to expand the WTO's coherence with other international and regional organizations. I intend to continue working along these lines.
Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework are clear examples of that. Monitoring of the measures taken in the context of the current crisis is another example. Trade finance and the recent initiatives to convene stakeholders at the WTO to address this issue globally are also examples of our capacity to promote a coherent approach to global problems. The same can be said of the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF). We should build on this in the future, and pay more attention to the regional level, which is becoming more and more relevant, including for our trade-related technical assistance.
We are engaged in joint research with other international organizations, such as the ILO, the OECD, UNCTAD and Regional Development Banks. A joint study on trade and climate change jointly produced by the WTO with UNEP will soon be published.
On a more macro level, the building of bridges with the UN system, with trade being part of the Millennium Development Goals' endeavour and through my own involvement in the Chief Executives' Board, should also help to improve coherence in our work with the United Nations family.
Boosting outreach
This is one area where, despite our efforts, a lot of work remains to be done. There continues to be a disproportion between the activities we have amongst ourselves - over 7,000 meetings taking place in the Centre William Rappard every year - and the intensity of interaction with our environment and the public.
Starting with our own circle: there is room for improvement in the interaction with small and non-resident delegations. A review of the proportion of training resources offered to these members should be done, so as to ensure that their needs are addressed.
Then, reaching out to non-members, we have accessions, an area that many of you have pointed out as needing focus in the coming years. There is a certain malaise amongst acceding members, as they feel that the bar for accession seems to continuously rise. There are specific concerns on the part of LDCs on the use of the guidelines for their accession to the WTO.
Accession is a complex process, necessitating both domestic ownership and capacity, which require hard work in many acceding members. However, I believe that there may be merit in devoting more focused efforts as well as ensuring greater political attention to accessions, in particular those of Least Developed Countries. I for my part also intend to do so when this is required.
Turning now to our external stakeholders — NGOs, parliaments, staffers, academics, business — there is also a need to strengthen networking and increase transparency.
In the past four years, we have worked to enhance our engagement with civil society. We have launched a pilot accreditation project of local NGOs to facilitate their access to the WTO premises during Ministerial Conferences, Trade Negotiation Committees, and General Councils. We have devolved a greater portion of the organizational aspects of the WTO's Public Forum to civil society, allowing civil society to itself shape the Forum. I myself have regularly engaged with NGOs both in Geneva and during my travels, acknowledging their input in our work.
We have made better use of our website and of electronic dissemination, through webcasts. We have strengthened our outreach to academics, in particular those in developing countries. Just this week we have launched the WTO Essay Award for young economists.
But there is more to do. In my consultations with civil society ahead of this meeting, a number of ideas were raised. For example, a greater opening of our Trade Policy Reviews or greater engagement of civil society on the ground during WTO Technical Assistance missions. These ideas are worth exploring together.
Special attention, in my view, should be given to parliamentarians and staffers, who hold the keys to deciding agreements at the end of the day and adopting legislation in a WTO-consistent manner.
Our most challenging outreach problem, though, remains with the general public. The WTO has very high notoriety — but low popularity, even if this is changing, in particular in developing countries. The WTO is too complex to be user-friendly. Communicating WTO is like telling people that Lord Jones has died when they did not even know that Lord Jones was alive! Its complexity is a handicap — something which deserves serious thought. We need to think how we communicate in a friendlier way.
We have improved our WTO website, which is very well-rated amongst surfers of the web, but more can be done, using all three languages.
In sum, we need to change gear. The classic asymmetry in the politics of trade - the many who benefit are silent, the few who suffer are vocal - means that the burden of proof is on us. It is for us to make the case for open markets and better regulation. We need to have a better radar picture of media reporting on the WTO. Public perceptions continue to be too dotted, especially in the non- English speaking world. There is a need for further engagement with domestic and regional media. And the WTO Secretariat cannot do it alone; we need to work on this together.
A Secretariat at the service of members
Let me now turn to the Secretariat. It is small but beautiful. Comparatively small in size and therefore capable of rapidly adjusting to changes in priorities, in workload as in tasks. Beautiful because it is full of powerful intellects and efficient professionals and support staff devoted to servicing you.
My overall objective, as the head of the Secretariat, is to enhance its capacity of providing support to members. For that, there is a need to keep modernising the Secretariat, while keeping it frugal. Version.3 changes have increased productivity — and will continue to do so.
As to recruitment, I will continue to adhere to the principles of expertise, merit and diversity. In the last four years and even within the very limited overall staff turnover, we have increased the number of nationalities of our staff: we have added eight new nationalities from developing and Least Developed Countries. Sixty per cent of staff recruited at junior professional level have come from developing countries and LDCs. Half of them had gone through one of our internship programmes. Two-thirds of our internships went to developing-country and LDC young professionals.
But there is more to be achieved in terms of improving diversity, including on gender mainstreaming, as well as in improving our internships for young professionals, as suggested by some of you, in particular from developing and Least Developed Countries. I will continue to advance this.
We have worked to make the WTO a greener organization by developing a plan to cut down emissions. In this context I believe that we could work together to use more technology and reduce the paper flow to Delegations. As far as the Secretariat is concerned, I intend to pursue the objective of achieving a paperless Secretariat by 2012.
On the building, our aim is to keep the renovation costs within the envelope which has been agreed by members. The renovation works have already started in the south wing, with the date for the end of the entire works being Autumn 2012. By then, we will have renovated the Centre William Rappard and built its extension in the current south parking — local political specificities permitting of course. I count on the support and well-known lobbying skills of you all to engage in this important local campaign !
There will be the unavoidable disturbance during the works which we will strive to keep to a minimum. There will also be difficulties with parking, even if the Secretariat has vacated all but a handful of parking slots on site for your use. In advance I count on your understanding for the disturbances during the renovation and construction period.
Also on the Secretariat, I believe we have to increase its services, its support and its analytical capacity. The issue cuts across all areas of improvement I have identified.
We cannot do our work better without seriously increasing our research, analytical and dissemination capacity. We need to work further on our databases, in terms of accessibility and interoperability. But simply producing and publishing data is not enough. We need to be able to better analyze and share it. The WTO needs to become more of a reference on trade knowledge, i.e. on the analysis of global trade policy data and statistics. We need to move from production to interpretation, from raw numbers to trade intelligence. And again, this is key to all areas: negotiations, monitoring, dispute settlement, technical cooperation and outreach.
Also, we need to continue operating as a forward-looking radar on trade issues, but in a more systematic way. We need to be fully aware of new issues and examine potential future obstacles to trade, to be at the cutting edge of awareness of the shaping factors of world trade, to continue to better serve you. This requires efficient networking — and hence a stronger base in the WTO, so as to be able to provide members with simulations, quantifications, scenarios and options.
The changes introduced in the Secretariat so far have increased our efficiency, but we are working at near-full capacity. To be able to further improve our services to you, to be able to respond to requests for analytical work, we will need to increase our resources. Staff will have to be strengthened with more economists, lawyers and communication specialists. There is scope for redeployment which I will continue to do. But my own sense is that this will not be enough.
My approach to our budget has been a simple one: the budget is a forecast, not an authorization to spend. If there is money left, we give it back — which we have done. And the introduction of an activity-based budget will make us more accountable to you. We will have an occasion to discuss this in our next bi-annual budget. I count on your support for this.
One issue of particular concern is the current situation of the WTO staff pension plan. The plan, as you are aware, is of the collective responsibility of WTO staff and members. Apart from the negative impact of the crisis on the plan, it also suffers from an actuarial deficit, which should be addressed urgently. I trust that members will give due attention to solving this problem in the near future.
While on budgetary issues, I have a concern with the issue of arrears, in particular those of our poorest members. Some thought must be given to how they could start from a clean slate. Another concern is the increase of trust funds, which implies costly administrative work. We should seriously consider whether there is scope for the integration of at least some of the current activities provided by trust funds into the regular budget.
Let me close by addressing the question of WTO ministerial meetings, which many of you have raised during our consultations. We should de-dramatize ministerial meetings, make them a more regular exercise, where WTO activities are reviewed across the board, to ascertain the level of satisfaction of members with the running of WTO activities and to address priorities at a political level. We have not had a ministerial meeting since 2005 and my own sense is that we should not close 2009 without one. A regular ministerial meeting is one thing; ministerial involvement in negotiations is another. We should not confuse the two.
In conclusion, Mr Chairman, no major surgery needed in the WTO. No major overhaul of the system is required. But rather a long to-do list to strengthen the global trading system. I am ready to do my part and to assist members in achieving the objectives of this Organization. The WTO, as a living organism, should continue to improve its capacity to rapidly react to global challenges, as we are seeing in the current crisis, and to contribute to devising solutions to those challenges.
The reinforcement of the multilateral trading system, in particular through the conclusion of the Doha Round, should be our guiding light. In the constellation of global governance, let's work together to see the WTO star shining ever brighter.
I thank you Mr Chairman.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124085557829760091.html
Economic links have always been an important basis for the China-U.S. relationship, and the growth in trade between the two countries has been robust since the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. Today, China and the U.S. are each other's second-largest trading partner; the value of the two-way trade in goods exceeds $300 billion.
U.S. businesses have benefited greatly. In the past five years, American exports to China have doubled. The U.S. trade surplus with China in services has grown 36% every year, and the overall value of U.S. export services to China exceeded $16 billion last year. U.S. businesses have invested more than $60 billion in 57,000 projects in China. In 2007, American-funded companies in China enjoyed a 17% increase of profit, while domestically the profit of U.S. businesses dropped by 3% on average.
But the commercial ties between our two nations are affected by the global financial crisis. Chinese statistics show bilateral trade dropped 6.8%, and U.S. investment in China slumped 19.4%, on a year-on-year basis in the fourth quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year.
History tells us that the more serious a crisis becomes, the more committed we must be to openness and cooperation. Regrettably, however, trade measures by the U.S. against China are on the rise. Recently, American industries have petitioned the U.S. government for antidumping investigations, and for investigations under the World Trade Organization's "special safeguard provision," which could restrict imports of Chinese products. This will seriously test China-U.S. economic and trade relations.
Despite these challenges, the need to foster positive Sino-American ties has never been greater. We need to recognize the existing differences between us in social systems and economic development, and constantly enhance mutual understanding and trust. Both countries should step up cooperation on trade and investment issues, and explore and establish new possibilities for cooperation in such areas as agriculture, new and high technology, finance, energy and the environment. Dialogue and communication also need to be intensified concerning multilateral and regional trade and economic affairs. To that end, I would like to put forth four proposals:
- First, seize the opportunity for cooperation, and work together to tackle the crisis. At present, both governments have rolled out economic stimulus packages on a massive scale, which in turn are expected to become new growth areas for our trade and investment cooperation. For example, China's demand for infrastructure, machinery and equipment, and environmental protection is huge. It is hoped that both countries would turn these opportunities into tangible outcomes.
- Second, mutually open markets to expand trade and investment. The Chinese government does not pursue a trade surplus with the U.S. We will continue to encourage Chinese companies to import more from the U.S., and we will also welcome U.S. companies and trade-promotion agencies to be more active in China.
Since foreign direct investment is a basic element of China's opening-up policy, we welcome American companies that want to increase their investment in China. Meanwhile, we also encourage capable Chinese companies to invest in the U.S. We hope that the U.S. government will welcome Chinese investments and create an open and transparent investment environment.
- Third, strengthen bilateral dialogue and resolve differences properly. As trading partners with broad and close ties, both countries should not allow differences on some issues to affect their cooperation in areas of common interests. We need to use the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade to boost strategic mutual trust, expand dialogue and cooperation, and establish a high-level and stable regime of bilateral trade and investment facilitation.
- Fourth, safeguard the environment for trade and advance the Doha Round. The U.S. and China, as the largest and the third-largest trading countries in the world, respectively, should take the lead in following up the consensus reached at the G-20 Summit in London and refrain from formulating any new trade protection policies before the end of 2010. We should also exercise caution, avoid arbitrary use of the trade remedies allowed by the World Trade Organization, and honor our commitment to fight protectionism. The two countries should also work together to advance the Doha Round, strictly follow the mandates of the Doha Development Agenda, lock in what has already been agreed to in past negotiations, avoid reopening negotiations or adding new subjects, and seek the success of this round.
A positive, cooperative and comprehensive Sino-American relationship will surely bring new prosperity and development to both economies. I hope and believe that bilateral trade will rise to a new high and exceed $500 billion in the coming five years, growing in a more balanced way.
Mr. Chen is minister of commerce for the People's Republic of China.
Prize
The annual WTO Essay Award consists of a prize of CHF 5,000 to the author(s) of the winning essay. In the case of a co-authored paper, the prize will be equally divided among the authors. The winning paper will be officially announced at the annual meeting of the European Trade Study Group (ETSG), which is currently the largest conference specializing in international trade. The first WTO Essay Award for Young Economists will be made in September 2009 at the ETSG meetings in Rome, Italy. The winning author(s) will receive funding to attend the meetings.
Selection
An Academic Selection Panel is responsible for the selection of the winning paper. From 2009 to 2011 the Panel will comprise:
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati (Columbia University)
Professor Robert Staiger (Stanford University)
Professor Alberto Trejos (INCAE Business School).
Ex officio panel members will include Dr Patrick Low (Director, Economic Research and Statistics Division, WTO Secretariat) and Dr Hakim Ben Hammouda (Director, Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation, WTO Secretariat).
Dr Michele Ruta (Economist, Economic Research and Statistics Division, WTO) coordinates the work of the Selection Panel.
Eligibility
The paper must address issues related to the economics of the WTO (e.g. the design of trade agreements, contingent protection, trade facilitation, the effects of trade agreements, Aid for Trade, the economic aspects of dispute settlement). The author(s) of the paper must possess or be engaged in the completion of a PhD degree and, if over 30 years of age, be no more than two years past a PhD defence. In the case of co-authored papers, this requirement shall apply to all authors. In addition, to be considered for the Award, essays cannot exceed 15,000 words.
Important deadlines
The essays for the first award must be submitted by 30 June 2009. The Economic Research and Statistics Division at the WTO Secretariat will shortlist a number of eligible papers by 15 July 2009 and the Selection Panel will take a final decision by 15 August 2009. Only the author(s) of short-listed essays will be notified.
Publication
The winning essay will be published in the WTO Working Paper Series and it is the responsibility of the author(s) to endeavour to secure publication of the contribution in a journal.
Submissions
All submissions should be sent to Michele Ruta with the subject line "WTO Essay Award". Submissions should include as separate attachments in PDF format:
1. the essay
2. the CV of the author(s), specifying (i) current affiliation(s), (ii) the academic institution awarding the PhD, (iii) the year (or the expected year) of the PhD, (iv) the date of birth of the author(s).
A new book - "Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the 21st Century" - sponsored by the EDGE Network, will be published by Wilfred Laurier U Press with Centre for International Governance Innovation and International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in August. Interested readers can find out more about this book here. I'm honored to be one of the contributors to the book.
I was in Geneva the whole week for a meeting at the WTO. Yesterday, China decided to take the chicken case with the US a month after Dr. Zhang Xiangchen, China's DPR to the WTO, made the strong statement on chicken in the WTO. It seems Obama is in for a treat of Chinese-style stir-fried chicken. The question is, does he like Chinese take-outs as Bush did?
US ban on China poultry imports slammed
(Xinhua)
Updated: 2009-04-17 22:53
BEIJING - China said here Friday a recent US law banning poultry imports from China is "obviously discriminatory" and harms the due interests of Chinese poultry industry.
The Section 727 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, which was signed into US law in March, disrupts the normal Sino-US poultry trade activities and breaches the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on tariffs and farm produce, said Ministry of Commerce spokesman Yao Jian.
The Chinese mission to the Geneva-based WTO filed complaints to the organization on Friday about the Section 727. According to WTO procedures, once complaints are filed, the two concerned parties usually have some 60 days to resolve disputes through consultations.
If that fails, China can request the establishment of a WTO expert panel to investigate and rule on the legality of the US measure.
Yao said it was China's legitimate right as a WTO member to file such complaints. He urged the United States to attach importance to the strong concerns of China and properly resolve the dispute by WTO procedures.
China had many rounds of negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, on the issue and the Chinese poultry industry had also voiced strong opposition, but those dialogues failed to address China's concerns, Yao said.
"The international community should overcome the current hardships together, prevent the financial crisis from spreading and jointly fight trade protectionism," said Yao. "That was also a significant common understanding reached at the London summit by leaders of the Group of 20 countries in early April."
According to the Section 727, none of the funds made available in the Omnibus Appropriations Act can be used to "establish or implement a rule" allowing imports of poultry products from China.
China and the United States banned imports of each other's poultry products in 2004 following outbreaks of bird flu. They agreed to lift the bans at the Sino-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in 2004.
China did lift the ban but has complained that the United States was not following suit.
China imported 580,000 tons of chicken products from the United States last year, accounting for about 75 percent of total chicken imports.
As the G20 meeting opens, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, the Evian Group Founding Director, called for business leaders and academics from around the world to sign a petition to the G20 leaders for an urgent mobilisation of the business community to fight protectionism. The Text of the Petition is reproduced below. Interested readers can also find the text of the petition at Evian Group's website.
The Honourable Gordon Brown
Prime Minister, UK Government
Host, The G20 summit
Prime Minister
We are writing to you as global business executives, business school professors and business consultants a very strong message we would ask you to convey to the heads of government of the G20 meeting that you have convened on 2 April in London.
At this extremely perilous juncture of the global economy, we wish to express our total commitment to the maintenance and indeed improvement of the open global market economy and the rules-based multilateral trading system. Protectionism must not prevail.
We ask the G20 leaders to think back and to think forward. As the current state of the world economy is being labelled the worst since the 1930s, they should think back at the cataclysmic effects – especially in respect to employment – that the protectionist surge then inflicted.
We ask them to think forward. Over the course of the next decade there will be hundreds of millions of young people coming on to the labour markets in the developing world. This is perhaps the greatest challenge the world faces in the immediate future. Trade is by no means a guarantee that there will be sufficient growth for the required number of jobs to be created; but we can be sure that if trade continues to fall at the rate it is at present and if greater barriers are erected, the outlook becomes extremely bleak and millions, perhaps billions, will suffer.
The Declaration of the earlier G20 summit contained the right words on trade, especially paragraph 13 in the sub-section entitled "Commitment to an open global economy". Regrettably the words have not been translated into action. We believe it is imperative for the sake of the global economy and for the credibility of the G20 itself, that the Summit you will be chairing does ensure that action ensues.
We are petitioning the G20 to hear a resounding rejection of protectionism and an unambiguous commitment to an open global market economy along with specific measures and deadlines for implementation.
Statement by Dr. ZHANG Xiangchen (Minister and DPR of China to the
WTO) on the US Omnibus Appropriation Act of 2009
Tuesday,March 17,2009 Posted: 18:16 BJT(16 GMT)
http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bilateralcooperation/inbrief/200903/20090306106235.html
March 12, 2009
Mme. Chair,
I come to this meeting with a specific instruction from Beijing to
make an intervention under this item and express the serious concern
of the Chinese government about of the US Omnibus Appropriation Act of
2009.
On March 10th, the US Senate approved this Act with a section 727,
which constitutes a clearly discriminative measure against imports of
poultry from China. This section reads: "none of the funds made
available in this Act may be used to establish or implement a rule
allowing poultry products to be imported into the United States from
the People's Republic of China."
Mme. Chair, I know that everyone in this room is expert of WTO rules
and it is needless to explain why such discriminative measure is
forbidden by the WTO. Perhaps we could send to the Institute of
Training and Technical Cooperation of the WTO Secretariat a copy of
this section, which would serve as a perfect example for their
training courses. I believe that any trainee with a preliminary
knowledge of the WTO disciplines will tell that this section violates
the basic rules of the WTO including the MFN. We strongly disagree
with the US view that this section is in conformity with the WTO SPS
Agreement since we believe that the issue here is irrelevant with the
SPS Agreement.
Actually this section is not new. There was a section 733 of the same
language in the US Omnibus Appropriation Act of 2008. On that section,
China has been repeatedly expressing our serious concern with the US
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Most recently at the US Trade
Policy Review of June 2008, the US answered that "Section 733 is set
to expire at the end of fiscal year." We took that answer with
goodwill and believed that, with the expiry of the section 733, such
discriminative practice would come to its end. However, the only
result is that we have a section 727 of the same language and the same
discriminative nature.
Mme. Chair, The questions I would ask my US colleagues, colleagues of
other Missions and the Secretariat are: What should we, China and the
US, do to avoid the reappearance of another section 7xx next year?
What should we, all Members, do to prevent such discriminative
practice from undermining the multilateral trading system and sending
wrong signal to the outside world at this critical juncture of global
crisis?
How should we live up to our commitments repeatedly make both here at
the WTO and at the G20 to resist trade protectionism?
Thank you, Mme. Chair.
At the kind invitation of Dr. Sorajak Kasemsuvan at the International Institute for Trade and Development (ITD) , I went to Bangkok earlier this week to participate in the Regional Workshop on "FTA's Impacts on Developing Countries: the Asian Context" on March 17th. The ITD is jointly sponsored by the Government of Thailand and UNCTAD and is one of the most active centers on trade issues in the region. The workshop also marked the public launch of South East Asia Trade Policy Training Network (SEATRANET), a joint project between the APEC and Canadian International Development Agency.
(2009-03-07)
如果2003年重创香港经济的SARS病毒,是加速香港与大陆经贸整合的推手,那当前袭击台湾的金融海啸,可能是启动台湾与大陆经贸整合的关键诱因。
中国总理温家宝前天在人大开幕式上发表政府工作报告时回应台湾政府,将推动签定"综合性经济合作协议",逐步建立"具两岸特色的经济合作机制"。
台湾总统马英九当晚表示,第三次江陈会将在今年六月前举行,希望"两岸经济合作架构协议"(ECFA)能列入谈话议题。这也是马政府第一次列出了ECFA的对谈时间点。
其实,ECFA原本叫CECA(Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement),外界判断是因为和香港与大陆签署的CEPA只差一个字,所以马英九亲上火线定调,只用中文"两岸经济合作架构协议"。
经济部长尹启铭则暂把CECA正名为ECFA(Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,台语"A搁发",意即台湾会再发)。
涉及两岸的议题就是摆脱不了政治纠缠,台湾内部也难达成共识,过去是中文名玩来玩去,现在连洋名也要变来变去。
遇上罕见的金融大风暴,马政府上台后,拼经济拼不出,反而是出口崩盘导致经济病重。面对经济急需治疗及恐成经济孤儿的威胁,官方要力推与大陆签署CECA。
民进党在总统选举受挫后,接着又被扁案压得喘不过气,CECA正好提供了一个反攻的议题,抨击的逻辑是:先经济后政治,台湾经济上过分依赖大陆,很可能导致台湾"港澳化",最终两岸统一将水到渠成。
在野党从政治面发动攻势,马政府则试图从经济角度强调与大陆签署ECFA的急迫性。简单来说,就是要避免台湾经济边缘化,因为"亚细安十加一"(亚细安十国加上中国大陆)明年将启动,而"亚细安十加三"(亚细安十国加上大陆、日本、韩国)也预计在2015年落实。
从明年起,大陆与亚细安十国之间的进口关税税率在10%以下的品项将降到零关税。而三年后,韩国和日本将加入零关税行列。韩国是台湾经济的主要竞争对手,让台湾焦虑的其实是"亚细安十加三"。
以石化业产品为例,明年亚细安国家的产品进入大陆将免税,但是台湾业者还得承担6.5%至14.9%的高关税,竞争力将被削弱。
台湾塑胶原料公会理事长、台化总经理洪福源日前表示,台湾泛石化产品每年产值高达40亿新台币,如果再不救,"等于三分之二的外销市场拱手让人"。
如果产业没竞争力,一个应对方式可能就是外移到大陆或东南亚。但这可能造成台湾产业"空洞化",台湾民众的饭碗将跳舞。
根据中华经济研究院的数字,"亚细安十加三"可能导致台湾经济增长率下降0.15个百分点,生产总额下降12.4亿美元,11万4000人会失去工作。
官方借研究机构和媒体抛出惊人数据,不过,台湾智库董事长陈博志教授认为,那些数据至少被夸大24倍。
陈博志也是民进党主席蔡英文的智囊之一。他在接受本报访问时说,那份研究的假设是,中国对其他国家的关税是9.1%,而对亚细安加三是零。不过,根据 2007年的资料算出,中国对其他国家的实际关税只有1.95%,因为有一些高关税的项目,它的贸易量其实很少,而且很多产品是可享有出口退税。
陈博志指出,台湾产品科税可能还不到1.95%,因为台湾卖到大陆的产品是加工后再出口,那个税还要更低。他认为,马政府刻意夸大数据,以突出签署CECA的急迫性。
合作协议要谈什么
内容至今还没出来
不过,对照香港和台湾,香港与大陆签CEPA的意图简单直接,就是希望能进入大陆市场。台湾的意图比较复杂多重,它不只是为了大陆市场,更关键的是要放眼全球,希望在和大陆达成某种协议后,可以和亚细安国家、日本以及美国等签署FTA(自由贸易协定)。
受访的政大经济系教授林祖嘉说:"主要就是中共的压力很大,如果不签,大概就会像过去八年那样子,卡在大陆市场,我们有40%的出口都到大陆去,所以实 际上反而是和中国走得更近。如果和他们签了架构,台湾就可以和其他国家谈FTA。像新加坡就讲得很清楚,新加坡和台湾的关系不可以走在大陆的前面。"
林祖嘉指出,香港的CEPA和台湾的CECA,味道都是一样,都是在WTO的标准下进行。差别在于,香港和大陆的CEPA是循"一国两制"的方针进行,台湾不可能接受"一国两制"。如果大陆要把"一个中国"的原则加进去,那台湾可能提出"一中各表"。"
陈博志则认为,马政府不能幻想和大陆签了CECA架构,就必然打通和其他国家签署FTA的通道。他说,如果真要考虑CECA,就必须争取和大陆签署CECA的同时,也签署加入"亚细安十加一",以及获得大陆承诺不阻止台湾和其他国家签署FTA。
他说:"要保证台湾的利益,最好一手交钱,一手交货。就一起签嘛,大家不要欺骗。东协(亚细安)十加一是大陆在主导,如果这个它都不让你签,那我们还可以相信它的承诺吗?"
陈博志以抓山猪作比喻,山猪很勇猛,硬抓是抓不到的,就只能三面包围它,留一个缺口让它跌入陷阱,"这个道理简单不过,他不让你和别人往来,让你对他有 高度的依赖"。以香港为例,陈博志不看好香港未来的发展,因为香港没有制造业,太过依赖大陆游客,金融业方面也不排除可能被上海取代。
尽管马政府力推两岸经贸"正常化",但台湾可能被"香港化"、大陆"以经促统"的战略,在野党及好些民众都时时记在脑中。
冒着政治上的风险,马政府还是要推CECA,或许只能说明台湾的经济情况确实很糟。马英九还引用了已故蒋经国总统当年力推"十大建设"时的名言疾呼:"今天不做,明天会后悔。"
两岸分歧虽然大,但却不如台湾内部的鸿沟。到底大陆与台湾的经贸关系是"正常化"还是"香港化"?是依赖还是利用?是经济需求,还是统一前奏?接下来,就要看马政府和在野党的文宣战怎么打了。
北京时间3月6日半夜,美国参议院将对2009年综合拨款法案进行表决。按照流程,这一2月25日已经在众议院通过的法案,只要在参议院通过,再经总统奥巴马签字,即可生效。
而在中国,上百名人大代表正关注着美国这一国内法案的进展。因为这一法案中有一条:“根据本法所提供的任何拨款,不得用于制订或执行任何允许美国进口中国禽肉产品的规则。”
“如果这一条款通过,5年内,中国禽肉都不可能重返美国市场。”中国食土商会禽肉分会监事长、吉林德大有限公司董事长王秀林向本报记者表示。
据本报记者了解,此前已经有来自山东、黑龙江、内蒙古、广东四省的超过100名人大代表,联名向全国人大提交建议,要求针对美国这一明显歧视中国禽肉产品的条款,中国政府应该表示强烈抗议,并且暂停美国禽肉进口。
奥巴马政府上任以来,其强烈的贸易保护主义倾向一直为外界担忧。但是此前谁也没有想到,两个贸易大国2009年的首场较量,会从各自的立法者开始。
歧视中国条款世界首创
在两国贸易界,这一新条款被称为“727条款”。
“这一条款的内在含义是,中国禽肉产品如果要恢复对美国的出口,美国农业部必须要到中国进行一系列的检验、认证、许可的工作,但是现在,他们不能利 用财政预算的钱来进行这些工作,甚至不得购买到中国检验的机票。因此,实际上就是全面禁止了美国政府从事任何有关恢复中国禽肉进口的工作,也就从本质上断 绝了中国禽肉进口美国的可能性。”一位中国商务部官员向本报记者表示:“这是一种新的贸易保护主义做法,以前我们从来没有在世界其他国家、或者其他产品上 看到过类似做法。”
但是该名官员非常明确地表示,这种首创的做法“肯定违反了WTO的非歧视性原则,是可以诉诸WTO的”。
2月27日,美国众议院通过法案后,商务部新闻发言人姚坚发表谈话称,这是典型的歧视性的贸易保护主义做法,严重违反了WTO最惠国待遇原则和普遍 取消数量限制规则。中方对此表示遗憾和强烈反对,并敦促美国参议院和美国政府尽快取消这一条款,否则中方将保留诉诸WTO的权利。
3月4日,中国数位人大代表到美国驻华使馆,请他们转递给美国农业部、商务部、贸易代表办公室、参议两院所有议员的抗议信,美国使馆官员答应传真回美国。
此外,中国商务部约见了美国驻华官员,中国驻美使馆约见了美国相关部门官员,表达中国政府的抗议。
但是中方的努力并未获得美方肯定答复。目前所有方面都认为,如果不出意外,美国参议院和奥巴马都会不经修改、直接通过和签署这一法案。
5年拉锯战
当听到这一法案时,王秀林等一批参与过禽肉谈判的中方代表,都感到深深的被欺骗感。
2004年,中美同时发生禽流感,中国随之停止了对美国禽肉产品的进口。2004年4月中美商贸联委会上,双方同意同时解除禁令——中国开放美国冷冻禽肉及制品进口,美国开放中国熟制禽肉制品进口。在美国明确作出承诺的前提下,中国随后单方面开放了对美国禽肉的市场。
但是美国方面却进展甚微,在美国农业部对中国熟制禽肉制品进行了几次检验后,美国贸易代表办公室突然提出,要求将中国禽肉、猪肉、牛肉等肉类制品贸易列入一揽子谈判计划,否则不予放行,双方谈判重回僵局。
在中国商务部和农业部的强烈反对下,中美2006年终于在禽肉出口问题上获得进展:2006年5月,美国同意批准中国来料加工方式生产的熟制禽肉进口,并且向中方承诺,中国禽肉出口已无技术问题。
但中方没有想到的是,2007年底,美国突然在农业拨款法案中列入,不得将款项用于制定实施中国禽肉进口的规定(733条款)。当时,中国业界曾经 组团向美国表示抗议,美国政府12月23日向中方表示,布什总统不会签字。3天后,美国总统布什签署法案,733条款没有丝毫改动。
中国家禽业界继续努力:联名致信美国农业部部长、约见美国行业驻华使馆官员及行业代表、组团赴美与美国农业部副部长、美国贸易代表办公室进行工作会议。中国商务部也在中美商贸联委会上明确提出反对733条款。
中国商务部官员和企业皆回忆,在当时的会议上,美国农业部长明确表示733条款错误。并且承诺在2009年的拨款法案中,美国农业部将全力保证该条款不再出现。
但是中国方面等到的结果是,2009年2月25日,美国众议院通过拨款法案,继续保有该项条款,甚至比在2008年拨款法案中规定更加严格。
在双方互相作出开放禽肉市场承诺的5年后,中国从美国进口禽肉制品累计超过400万吨,占到中国禽肉进口总量的75%以上,占中国禽肉市场总量的7%。据商务部提供的数据,仅2008年一年,中国从全球进口了79万吨鸡肉及制品,其中从美国就进口了58万吨。
但是与此同时,中国没有出口1斤禽肉制品到美国。相关官员表示,如果海关有少量统计,皆属于企业误申报。
百名代表联名建议
2009年2月底,多次经历希望与失望的中国家禽业界,终于失去对美国政府、国会的信任。适逢中国“两会”召开,家禽业界拥有4位人大代表:山东凤 祥(集团)有限责任公司董事长刘学景、黑龙江正大实业有限公司董事长姜鸿斌、内蒙古赛飞亚集团董事长李秉和、广东江丰实业股份有限公司董事长谭钜添。在他 们的努力下,来自这四个省的总计超过100名人大代表,答应在向大会提交的建议上署上自己的名字。
该建议的要求是:“1,中国政府应对美国这种做法表达强烈抗议;2,立即暂停美国禽肉进口。”
建议中表示,美国禽肉的大量进口,严重损害了我国从业农民利益和行业稳定。家禽行业涉及8000万农民,每年为中国农户创造纯收入2000亿元。
中国畜牧协会和食土进出口商会皆明确表示,支持这一建议。
“现在进口禽肉确实是一个很大的问题,”一位畜牧业界企业负责人向本报记者表示:“目前中国大量从美国进口低价禽肉制品,特别是家禽下水,这些产品 由于在美国不用于食用,所以价格非常低廉,非常轻易地占据了中国市场,并且压低了价格。因此对于中国养殖户来说,养殖家禽变得无利可图,养殖——饲料—— 粮食整个行业链条都受到影响。”
王秀林表示,即使出于食品安全的理由,美国的做法也没有依据。按照国际规则,非疫区的禽肉是安全的,而且每年从美国进口到中国的禽肉制品,不合格的超过100批。
尽管按照人大规则,相关建议将在“两会”结束后转交有关部委。但是人大代表的呼吁已经引起中国商务部重视,3月4日,相关代表和商务部官员进行了会晤。商务部表示,将认真研究这一问题。
但是贸易报复并非商务部首选,相关官员表示,商务部仍然希望能够通过双边协商和在多边体制下解决这一问题。
At the kind invitation of Professors Ramon Torrent and Pierre Sauvé, I will be in Barcelona early next week to teach in the University of Barcelona's new Master of Laws in International Economic Law and Policy (LL.M. IELPO) program. With the stellar faculty from around the world, this program is one of the best of its kind in the world and I strongly recommend it to anyone who is interested in WTO matters.
In the summer, I will be teaching another program in Macau. This course is run by the IEEM in Macau and again taught by some of the best scholars on WTO issues. Another advantage is the nice location in the gaming capital of the world.
I should also mention both programs have scholarships available to talented students from developing countries. Please approach the respective programs via the links on their websites.
| 商务部新闻发言人就美国众议院通过的2009年综合拨款法案涉及我输美禽肉产品歧视性条款发表谈话 |
| 2009-02-27 18:21 文章来源:商务部新闻办公室 |
| 文章类型:原创 内容分类:新闻 |
My comments on Taiwan's proposed economic agreement with China:
1. The new name unveiled by Ma today seems to mirror the agreement between ASEAN and China, which is called "Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between ASEAN and PRC".
2. However, as the pact will not deal with political designations, one wonders what will be the respective names for China and Taiwan in the agreements. Will Taiwan be referred to by its official name in the WTO, i.e., "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu", or "The Republic of China"?
3. Ma said that Taiwan would seek to sign FTAs with other countries in addition to signing an ECFA with China. I think it is more accurate to say that Taiwan can only negotiate FTAs with other countries after it agrees to negotiate something with China first. This seems to be the "gentleman's agreement" adopted by China and Taiwan in the WTO setting, under which both sides agree to support the proposal of the other. See my earlier post on the appointments of Chinese and Taiwanese candidates to WTO committees.
4. Minister of Economic Affairs (MOEA) Yiin Chii-ming said the ECFA would not be an FTA. What is it then? The WTO only allows FTAs and CUs for goods and EIAs for services. Apparently this is not a CU or EIA. If it is not an FTA, how could it be allowed under the WTO framework?
5. Unlike HK and Macau, Taiwan is not a free port. But I doubt Taiwan would make substantial tariff reductions to China due to domestic political concerns. In that case it would run afoul of the requirements under GATT Art XXIV, unless, of course, they decides to invoke the enabling clause.
For further info on the ECFA, see the report below in the Taipei Times
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/02/28/2003437231
Ma seeks to settle disputes over economic agreement
WHAT’S IN A NAME?: The president said that changing the name of the economic agreement to include the word ‘framework’ would establish a clear range of issues
By Mo Yan-chih, Flora Wang and Shih Hsiu-chuan
STAFF REPORTERS
Saturday, Feb 28, 2009, Page 1
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday sought to settle disputes over the government’s plan to sign a cross-strait comprehensive economic cooperation agreement (CECA) with China by changing the name to “cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement [ECFA].”
Renaming the agreement an ECFA, Ma said in an interview with Era TV that the term “framework” would help set a clear range of issues.
This would make it possible for the two sides to sign certain parts of the agreement first and seek consensus on other parts later, he said.
“We are not only signing economic agreements with China. It’s part of our global strategy. It’s very important. If we do not start doing it today, we will regret it tomorrow,” Ma said.
Signing an economic pact with China was part of Ma’s election campaign that aimed to strengthen cross-strait economic and trade cooperation. However, the government’s plan to sign an agreement has sparked concern over its possible impact on national interests.
Ma said last week that his administration would push for the implementation of an agreement, but would seek public opinion on the title, content and form of the agreement.
He said that signing an ECFA should help push normalization of cross-strait economic and trade relations and prevent the nation from being marginalized as East Asia integrates economically.
The two sides can reach a consensus on tariff cuts for major industries including petroleum and textiles first, and discuss other areas of cooperation such as investment protection and intellectual property rights in the future, he said.
The government will seek to sign free trade agreements (FTA) or similar economic agreements with other major trading partners in addition to signing an ECFA with China, he added.
“The agreement will be signed based on the principle of reciprocity, equality and dignity between the two sides,” Ma said.
In response to Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s (王金平) opposition to signing an economic pact without prior legislative oversight, Ma said that the agreement should be sent to the legislature for review after a draft was signed.
“What would the Legislative Yuan review if the two sides haven’t first negotiated an agreement?” Ma said.
The president said that the government would present a report to the legislature on the direction and some details of the plan before negotiating with China, while holding public forums over the next few months to seek public opinion on the issue.
Ma brushed off opposition criticism that the pact would belittle Taiwan’s sovereignty and said that no country’s sovereignty had been belittled by signing an FTA or similar agreement.
Taiwan’s sovereignty was not belittled when signing cross-strait direct flight agreements with China, and an ECFA was not a political agreement as no sovereignty issues would be addressed, he said.
Meanwhile in the legislature, Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) said the Legislative Yuan would enjoy the absolute authority to approve or reject an ECFA with China if the government signed such a pact.
“It is very clear that [the agreement] would not take effect if the legislature disapproves it,” Liu said when fielding questions from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Gao Jyh-peng (高志鵬).
“We will fully communicate not only with lawmakers but also withthe public. We will also report [the contents of the agreement] to the Legislative Yuan before [we] negotiate [the agreement with China],” Liu added.
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) also vowed during the question-and-answer session to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty when negotiating.
“There is a special relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. [Any cross-strait agreements] involving a legal amendment must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan [for review] in accordance with the Act Governing Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area [兩岸人民關係條例],” she said.
Meanwhile, Minister of Economic Affairs (MOEA) Yiin Chii-ming (尹啟銘) and Mainland Affairs Council Vice Chairman Fu Dong-cheng (傅棟成) last night attended a press conference at the Government Information Office to state the government’s position on the pact.
Yiin said that the pact was provisionally called an ECFA. When asked whether it sounded like an auspicious name as pronounced in Hoklo (also known as Taiwanese) — the acronym ECFA sounds like “the country will get richer” (A擱發) — Yiin said he agreed.
Pronunciation of the acronym CECA sounds like “washing feet” in Hoklo.
He said the official name of the pact in Chinese and English would not be finalized until after negotiations with China.
Yinn said that the government would not deal with political designations in the pact.
The pact will not be signed on the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) model used by China and Hong Kong, under which Hong Kong was regarded as a special administrative region of China, Yiin said, adding that it would not be an FTA either.
In related news, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus secretary-general Yang Chiung-ying (楊瓊瓔) urged the DPP caucus to drop its plan to boycott the government’s special budget requests to boost infrastructure investment.
The DPP caucus said on Thursday it would refuse to review the budget proposal if the government failed to refer the content of the agreement to the legislature before signing it.
DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said it would be arrogant and disrespectful to the public for the government to refer any agreement to the legislature for review after signing it.
“Any agreement with China should be made public prior to signing,” she said yesterday.
Tsai said Taiwan’s sovereignty would be concerned no matter what the agreement was called.
Any important policy like this should be decided upon by the public and the process of it should be transparent as well, she added.
“The government is now saying that the agreement will be signed before it is submitted to the legislature for review. Well, this is not democracy,” she said. “What the government is planning to do will damage Taiwan’s democracy for sure.”
Taiwan Solidarity Union Chairman Huang Kun-huei (黃昆輝) said the government should listen to its people before officials make any further moves. Huang expressed concern that signing an ECFA with China would impact on Taiwan’s manufacturing industry.
ADDITIONAL REPORTING BY JIMMY CHUANG