Thursday 14 May 2009

MOFCOM statement on China's rationale for negotiating FTAs

当前商务形势系列述评之二
加快自由贸易区建设 为外贸稳定增长服务

2009-05-13 08:50  文章来源:商务部新闻办公室
文章类型:原创  内容分类:新闻

当前商务形势系列述评之二

加快自由贸易区建设 为外贸稳定增长服务
商务部国际经贸关系司


  自由贸易区建设已经成为我国新时期对外开放的新战略。胡锦涛总书记在党的十七大报告中提出“实施自由贸易区战略”,温家宝总理在2009年政 府工作报告中指出“要加快实施自由贸易区战略”。在当前世界金融危机影响继续扩散的情况下,自贸区为我国应对危机,统筹两个市场、两种资源提供了更大的回 旋余地,在保持我国进出口稳定增长方面发挥了明显的积极作用。

  一、自贸区可营造进出口增长的良好环境

  迄今为止,我国已对外签署了8个自贸协定,涉及16个国家和地区,包括与东盟、智利、巴基斯坦、新西兰、新加坡和秘鲁的自贸协定以及与香港、 澳门的更紧密经贸关系安排。上述协定涵盖我2008年对外贸易总额的五分之一。这些国家和地区作为自贸伙伴,有望成为我国新的重要外部市场,从而使我国进 出口环境得到改善。

  首先,自贸区将通过改善市场准入推动我国进出口增长。在自贸协定中,参与各方应将90%以上的产品关税逐步削减到零,其减负、增益的效果是相 当可观的。作为进口方的企业,可以凭借我国向自贸伙伴提供的零关税或优惠关税待遇,获得新的进口渠道和更为价廉物美的进口产品;作为出口方的企业,可以凭 借自贸伙伴向我国提供的零关税或优惠关税待遇,使其出口产品打入新的市场或扩大原有的市场份额。这对遭受金融危机冲击,处在微利、无利甚至亏损状态的众多 我国企业来说,是难得的“利好”消息。

  其次,自贸区将为我国进出口增长提供制度性保障。自贸协定是参与各方经贸关系达到高水平的重要标志。在自贸协定中,参与各方共同就彼此之间的 经贸发展做出了全方位、系统性的安排,包括为贸易提供优惠的市场准入条件,并建立合理的贸易救济和争端解决机制。这可使彼此间未来的贸易变得稳定、可预 见,可避免出现不正常的贸易波动。

  还有,自贸区将提高我国在国际贸易谈判中的地位和话语权。目前,许多国家通过发展自贸区,组建区域经济集团,在国际贸易谈判中集体争取利益。建设自贸区,同样会促使我与有关国家强化利益纽带,从而在国际贸易谈判中相互协调,相互支持,能够更好地维护我国的利益。

  二、自贸区可打造新的进出口增长点

  自贸区可以降低出口成本,增强出口竞争力,提高出口利润,从而成为出口新的增长点。目前,我国播下的自贸区“种子”,已经开始“生根发芽”,而且“长势喜人”。这是我国出口开始受到金融危机影响的灰色背景下的一道亮光。

  第一,我国对自贸伙伴出口总量明显扩大。2008年全年,我国对协定已经生效实施的5个自贸伙伴(不包括与港澳的更紧密经贸关系安排)的出口占同期出口总额的9%,约1288亿美元,同比增长20.9%,出口增速高于同期17.2%平均出口增速。

  第二,我国对自贸伙伴双边出口额显著增长。以中国-智利自贸区为例,自2006年10月开始实施,2007年,我对智出口增幅为42%,2008年出口同比增幅为39.3%,实施两年来,我对智出口增速两倍于我同期总体出口增速。

  第三,我国对自贸伙伴出口结构不断优化。中国-智利自贸协定实施头两年,我电器及电子产品出口额分别同比增长57%和53%;计算机与通信技 术出口额分别同比增长72%和34%;机械设备出口额分别同比增长50%和40%;小轿车在实现零突破的基础上,出口量分别为1950辆和12025辆, 长城、奇瑞和哈飞汽车等8个自主品牌的汽车进入智利市场。

  第四,我国企业已从自贸区中逐步受益。2008年以来,中兴通讯公司出口到智利和越南的3300多万美元通讯产品,凭借120份自贸区原产地 证书,获得了进口国1150多万元人民币的关税减免。大连中远船务公司凭借《亚太贸易协定》原产地证书,促使全球最大、总货值超过7815万美元的举力浮 船坞顺利出口韩国,仅一单货物就少缴关税195.39万美元,合人民币1300多万元。

  三、自贸区有助于减少贸易争端和规避技术壁垒

  目前,越来越多的国家受金融危机影响,经济衰退,失业上升,导致国际贸易保护主义抬头。在减少和缓解贸易争端以及规避技术壁垒方面,自贸区也可发挥一定的作用。

  (一)自贸伙伴都承认我国市场经济地位。东盟10国、南非、智利、新西兰、澳大利亚、巴基斯坦、秘鲁、冰岛、哥斯达黎加等自贸伙伴都承认我市场经济地位,为我出口创造了相对公平的贸易环境。

  (二)自贸区可减少和化解贸易摩擦。自贸区各方遇有贸易争端,首先考虑取销自贸区优惠待遇,回归WTO最惠国待遇,对摩擦起到缓冲作用。不同 的自贸协定对贸易救济措施的使用有不同规定,即使是最宽松的协定,也有事先充分磋商寻求友好解决的规定。例如,中国-智利自贸协定实施后,智未再对我发起 反倾销和反补贴调查。

  (三)自贸协定还有助于规避技术壁垒。在自贸协定中,我与有关国家在技术性贸易壁垒(TBT)、卫生和动植物卫生措施(SPS)方面开展标准互认,加强便利合作,严格限制了技术壁垒的使用。
打印

Wednesday 13 May 2009

What do Mangosteen, Olympic Medals and Shaolin Monks have in common?

You can find out the answer after reading this interesting info on China's FTA developments.

The original link is here.

第四展馆 — 领域开放 实现跨越    

自由贸易区建设——方兴未艾

The Booming Development of Free Trade Areas (FTAs)

自贸区战略由来:从构想到战略

Origin of Free Trade Area Strategy Conception to Strategy


      自由贸易区定义:
      所谓自由贸易区,是指两个或两个以上国家或地区通过签署协定,在WTO最惠国待遇基础上,相互进一步开放市场,分阶段取消绝大部分货物的关税和非关税壁垒,改善服务和投资的市场准入条件,从而形成的实现贸易和投资自由化的特定区域。

Definition of Free Trade Area
A FTA refers to a specific geographical area formed by the customs territories of two or more ries/regions that have signed agreements to further open up markets, phase out most of the tariffs and non-tariff barriers for goods and improve market access for trade in services and investment amongst the members on the basis of the WTO MFN treatment so as to realize trade and investment liberalization.


      区域贸易安排数量(自贸区为主)

Number of Regional Trade Agreements (mainly FTAs)


      自由贸易协定(FTA)

Free Trade Agreement (FTA)




      2000年11月25日,朱�基总理出席在新加坡举行的第四次中国—东盟领导人会议时,提出探讨建立中国—东盟自贸区可能性的建议,得到东盟国家积极响应。这是中国首次提出自贸区建设构想。
      图为东盟各国地理位置和2000年与中国的双边经贸关系概况。

On November 25th, 2000, during the Fourth China-ASEAN Summit held in Singapore, Premier Zhu Rongji proposed to explore the possibility of establishing a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area which was responded positively by ASEAN ries. This is the first time that China proposed a FTA initiative.
The picture shows the geographic location of ASEAN ries and the general information on China-ASEAN bilateral trade in 2000.


      2007年10月15日,在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上,胡锦涛总书记在向大会所作报告中提出“实施自由贸易区战略”。
      图为中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会会场。

On October 15th, 2007, in the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao, the General Secretary, proposed the “Implementation of a FTA Strategy” in his report to the Congress.
The picture shows the venue of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.


      自贸区国际法依据:
      1.《关贸总协定》第24条和乌拉圭回合《关于解释1994年 关贸总协定第24条的谅解》
      2.《服务贸易总协定》第5条
      3. 东京回合《差别的更优惠待遇、互惠以及发展中国家更充分参与》框架协议 (简称授权条款)
      4.《关贸总协定》第25条(简称免责条款)
      自贸区国内法依据:
      《中华人民共和国对外贸易法》第5条:
      “中华人民共和国根据平等互利的原则,促进和发展同其他国家和地区的贸易关系,缔结或者参加关税同盟协定、自由贸易区协定等区域经济贸易协定,参加区域经济组织。”

International Legal Basis for FTA
1. Article XXIV of the “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”(GATT) and “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV ”
2. Article V of the “General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS)
3. Tokyo Round, the “Agreement on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing ries” (also referred to as the Enabling Clause)
4. Article XXV of GATT (also referred to as the Waiver Clause)
Domestic Legal Basis for FTA
Article 5 of the “Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China”
The People's Republic of China shall promote and develop trade relations with other ries and regions,conclude or participate in customs union agreements, free trade agreements and other regional economic and trade agreements, and participate in regional economic organizations in the principle of equality and mutual benefit.



      2004年11月19日, 胡锦涛主席和新西兰总理海伦・克拉克在亚太经合组织领导人会议期间共同宣布启动自由贸易协定谈判。
      图为2001年海伦・克拉克访华时出席新西兰教育情况介绍会并作精彩演讲。

Chinese President Hu Jintao and New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark jointly announced the launching of negotiations on a free trade agreement during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting on November 19th, 2004.
The picture shows New Zealand Prime Ministrer Helen Clark made a keynote speech on education cooperation and exchange between China and New Zealand during her visit to China in 2001.


      2004年7月6日,中国与海合会双方共同宣布启动中国—海湾合作委员会自由贸易区谈判。
      图为海湾合作委员会6国(沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、科威特、卡塔尔、巴林、阿曼)会议现场。

China and GCC jointly announced the launching of negotiations on China-Gulf Cooperation Council FTA on July 6th, 2004.
The picture shows the venue of a meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council which has 6 member ries, namely, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman.


      2006年9月7日,全国人大常委会委员长吴邦国在访问智利期间与智利总统米歇尔・巴切莱特共同宣布启动中智自贸区谈判。
      图为2007年智利总统米歇尔・巴切莱特出席在圣地亚哥举行的首届中国拉美企业家高峰会。

Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committe of the National People’s Congress of China, and Chilean President Michelle Bachelet jointly announced the launching of China-Chile FTA negotiations on trade in services during his visit to Chile on September 7th, 2006.
The picture shows Chilean President Michelle Bachelet attended the first China-Latin America Business Summit in Santiago in 2007.


      2005年4月5日,国务院总理温家宝访问巴基斯坦期间,双方启动自贸区谈判。
      图为2005年6月15日,中国—巴基斯坦塔什库尔干边民互市开市。

China and Pakistan launched negotiations on free trade agreement during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan on April 5th, 2005.
The picture shows the opening of the Taxkorgan exchange marketplace on the frontiers between China and Pakistan on June 15th, 2005.


      2006年8月,中新双方领导人宣布在中国—东盟自由贸易区基础上启动中国—新加坡双边自由贸易区谈判。
      图为新加坡概况介绍。

In August 2006, Chinese and Singaporean leaders jointly announced that, the two sides, built on the basis of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, launched the China-Singapore bilateral FTA negotiations.
The picture shows the basic information of Singapore.


      2004年11月29日,温家宝总理出席第八次中国—东盟领导人会议,双方签署了《中国—东盟全面经济合作框架协议货物贸易协议》。此后,双方又签署了《服务贸易协议》等。
      图为老挝首都万象的第八次中国—东盟领导人会议现场。

The “Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN” was signed when Premier Wen Jiabao attended the Eighth China-ASEAN Summit on November 29th, 2004. After that, the two sides signed the “ Agreement on Trade in Services”.
The picture shows the venue of the 8th China-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, capital of Lao PDR.


      2006年11月,商务部部长薄熙来与巴基斯坦商务部部长胡马云・阿赫塔尔・汗签署《中国—巴基斯坦自由贸易协定》。
      图为2005年12月9日,中国与巴基斯坦签署自由贸易协定早期收获协议。

Minister of Ministry of Commerce Bo Xilai and his Pakistani erpart Humayun Akhtar Khan signed China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement in November 2006.
The picture shows the signing ceremony of the “Early Harvest Program of the Free Trade Agreement between China and Pakistan” on December 9th , 2005.


      2005年11月18日,在韩国釜山APEC领导人非正式会议期间,中智双方签署《中国—智利自由贸易协定》。
      图为亚太经合组织(APEC)第17届部长级会议在韩国釜山开幕。

China and Chile signed the China - Chile Free Trade Agreement during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Busan On November 18th, 2005.
The picture shows the opening ceremony of the 17th Ministerial Meeting of APEC in Busan, Republic of Korea.


      2008年4月7日,在国务院总理温家宝和新西兰总理克拉克的见证下,商务部部长陈德铭与新西兰贸易部长菲尔・戈夫签署《中国—新西兰自由贸易协定》,这是我国和经合组织国家签署的第一个自贸协定。
      图为2008年4月8日,陈德铭部长会见新西兰贸易部长菲尔・戈夫。

Minister of Commerce Chen Deming and New Zealand Trade Minister Phil Goff signed the “Free Trade Agreement between China and New Zealand” in the presence of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark on April 7th, 2008.
The picture shows that Minister Chen Deming met with his New Zealand erpart Phil Goff on April 8th, 2008.


      2006年10月开始实施以货物贸易自由化为主的自贸协定
      10年内分阶段取消关税,涵盖中国税目总数97.2%的产品,智利税目总数98.1%的产品
      其中,立即取消关税的产品包括化工品、纺织品和服装、农产品、机电产品、车辆及零件、水产品、金属制品和矿产品等。

Began to implement the free trade agreement October 2006, mainly on the liberalization of trade in goods
Phase out tariffs covering 97.2% and 98.1% of China and Chile’s total tarifflines respectively
Of which, the tariffs of chemicals, textiles and clothing, agricultural products, machinery and electrical products, vehicles and spare parts, aquatic products, fabricated metal products and minerals products, etc. were subject to immediate elimination.




      随着中国—东盟自贸区货物贸易协议的实施,中国对东盟国家的出口迅速增加。
      图为中国—东盟博览会天津展台。

With the implementation of the Trade in Goods Agreement of China-ASEAN FTA, China’s exports to ASEAN ries witnessed tremendous growth.
The picture illustrates the Tianjin exhibition platform in China-ASEAN Expo.


      2008年北京奥运会制作金牌和铜牌所用的金和铜原料全部从智利进口,享受了中国-智利自贸区零关税待遇。
      图为北京奥运会金银铜牌。

All the gold and bronze raw materials used for the 2008 Beijing Olympics medals were imported Chile with zero tariff treatment under China-Chile Free Trade Agreement.
The picture shows the 2008 Beijing Olympic medals.


      随着中国与东盟贸易往来的不断加大,榴莲、山竹等东盟10国的热带水果开始走俏国内市场。
      图为广西南宁一水果店的老板在向顾客介绍东盟产热带水果。

With the growing trade between China and ASEAN ries, many tropical fruits these ries including durian and mangosteen become popular in the Chinese market.
The picture shows a fruit store owner introducing the tropic fruits originating ASEAN to customers in Nanning, Guangxi.


      根据中国-新西兰自贸协定,新西兰将为中国武术教练、中医等职业提供工作许可。
      上图为一些新西兰武术运动员在少林寺山门前合影留念。
      下图为新西兰新开设的一家中医诊所。

According to the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, New Zealand provides work permits to Chinese Wushu Martial Arts coaches and Traditional Chinese Medicine(TCM)practitioners.
The picture above shows a group of New Zealand Wushu athletes posing in front of the Shaolin Temple.
The picture below shows a newly-opened Chinese holistic healthcare clinic in New Zealand.

Tuesday 12 May 2009

New LLM program in Lisbon

My good friend Miguel Poiares Maduro has launched an innovative new LLM program in Lisbon. The faculty is drawn from leading authorities on different areas of law from around the world. While it is new, I strongly believe that it will soon become one of the leading programs in the world. Interested applicants can find more info on the program here. There are some scholarships available on a selective basis.

Monday 4 May 2009

New Wave of Transititional Product-specific Safeguard Measures Against China

美轮胎特保案或引发捕杀中国出口潮

2009年05月04日 15:32法人 】 【打印已有评论1

奥巴马或将改变美国政府多年来对中国出口产品“特保调查”的一贯态度和做法,若轮胎特保案一旦采取措施,极有可能引发美国乃至全球对中国进口产品的设限高潮

文 本刊记者 宋华安

日前,《法人》记者从接近中国商务部的人士获悉,美国钢铁工人联合会(USW)在4月20日向美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)提出申请,要求对从中国进口的轮胎进行特殊保障措施调查(以下简称“特保调查”),以达到限制进口中国轮胎的目的。这项标的价值达17亿美元的特保调查案,目前已引起中国商务部的高度关注。

业界人士表示,USW提起的该项“特保调查”是美国奥巴马政府针对中国产品实施特保条款调查的第一案。此调查美国产业一旦获胜,或将使美国对华实施 特保措施的势头高涨,更多的特保调查将接踵而来,同时也会引起其他WTO成员仿效,遏制和限制中国产品出口。在中国出口下滑趋势较为严峻的2009年,如 何积极应对美国的特保调查,以保障出口稳定回升,是政府和企业面临的重大课题。为此,《法人》记者采访了原中国商务部条法司和公平贸易局官员、现北京嘉润 道和律师事务所合伙人张涛律师。

本案的特殊意义

“目前中国是美国最大的轮胎出口国,2008年中国总计向美国出口4600万条轮胎。”张涛给《法人》记者提供了一组本案美国申请人——美国钢铁工 人联合会(USW)在申请书中所使用的数据。该数据显示,从2004~2008年,美国从中国进口的轮胎数量增长率为215%,美国轮胎产量下降25%。 美国汽车业的严重衰退,也给美国钢铁业以致命的打击。

USW认为中国出口到美国的轮胎已经严重影响了美国轮胎产业,其中包括美国工人的就业问题,以及可能导致越来越多的美国轮胎厂关闭。美国USW总裁Leo.W. Gerard 还公开宣称将利用美国贸易弥补法律“421条款”,即所谓的特保调查,来应对中国轮胎业的重压。

张涛表示,美国对中国的特保调查其实不是一个新鲜事物,从2002年起美国产业在布什总统任期内就对中国提起了6起特保调查。但这6起特保调查案均以失败告终,中国企业没有受到任何损害和损失。

本案的特殊意义在于:它可以被当成是检验奥巴马政府对“特保调查”的态度和做法乃至对中美贸易关系的“试金石”。

据业界人士表示,自2008年11月奥巴马上台执政美国以来,美国政府对特保的态度或许会有所改变。奥巴马的上台或应该引起中国企业的警觉。张涛认 为,长期以来,中国企业普遍对海外反倾销措施中的反倾销调查、反补贴比较熟悉和重视,但对“特保调查”一直不太关注。因为至今还没有一起因特保调查而遭受 损失的企业或行业。

特保调查

激增保障措施作为WTO允许成员方所采取的三大贸易救济措施之一(另外两个是反倾销和反补贴),是指当某一具体的产业由于受到突然大量增加的进口产 品的冲击,给进口国造成严重损害或严重损害威胁时,进口国政府可以实行临时性进口限制,主要通过增加关税、实施非关税措施(如数量限制)或两者并用来限制 进口,以达到国内产业免受国外产品冲击的目的。而特保与保障措施的一个重要区别就在于:保障措施针对的是正在进口的产品而实施的,其不考虑产品来源。也就 是说,只要是进口产品激增,不管是来自哪个成员方,进口方都可依据保障措施的有关条款对其启动保障措施的程序。这是WTO非歧视性原则在贸易救济中的具体 体现。而“特保条款”则是针对某特定成员国的进口来源。

据张涛介绍,1999年11月15日,中美签署了关于中国加入WTO的双边协议。该协议第13条规定,在中国加入WTO后的12年内,美国对中国产 品可以使用特殊保障措施机制。此后,这一条款成为中国加入WTO议定书第16条“特定产品过渡性保障机制”(即“特保条款”,据此采取的措施为“特保措施 ”)的内容。

该条款规定,WTO成员经事先确定的法律程序认定原产于中国的某项产品进口激增,并对其国内相关产业造成或威胁造成市场扰乱,则该成员可以对自中国 进口的此类产品采取限制措施。此外,《中国加入工作组报告》第245至260段对此特保条款又作了细化。这两部分规定构成了针对中国进口产品的特保条款机 制。一些WTO成员据此先后进行了相应的国内立法和实践。中国承诺允许其他WTO成员在入世(2001年12月入世)后12年内,可使用该条款来限制中国 进口产品。

同时,WTO议定书第16条还规定,如果一个WTO成员对某种中国进口产品采取了特保措施,并造成或威胁造成进入其市场的重大的贸易转移,该成员方可以针对该种中国进口产品采取特保措施。(HG: This is incorrect.)

美国特保“421条款”

张涛介绍,美国国会在2000年经由立法程序在《美国1974年贸易法》第四部分加入了第二章“进行贸易救济,避免美国市场遭受市场扰乱和贸易转移 ”的内容,其中包含第421节“针对市场扰乱采取的措施”、第422节“应对贸易转移的措施”和第423节“规则与条款的终止日期”。

依据“421条款”,在中国加入WTO后的12年内,若中国出口至美国的产品数量增加或者所依条件,对同类产品或直接竞争产品的美国国内产业造成或 威胁造成市场扰乱,美国总统可以在防止或补救市场扰乱必需的限度和时间内,针对中国产品加征关税或实施其他进口限制手段。由此,美国使用特保条款的国内立 法正式产生,这是美国为应对中国加入WTO而专门设计的防卫武器。

根据“421条款”,美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)可以自动或应申请启动特保措施调查,一般情况下ITC在60天内就做出决定。如果美国国际贸易委 员会裁决损害成立,将在20天内向总统及贸易代表办公室提交一份报告,贸易代表办公室在55天内向总统提出是否采取任何措施的建议。在此期间,贸易代表办 公室应举行听证会等,让进口商等利害关系方陈述意见,并可以与中国政府就此进行磋商。在收到贸易代表办公室提交的建议的15天之内,总统将公告采取具体措 施,但如果总统认为采取措施不符合国家经济利益或弊大于利,也可以不采取任何措施。

布什任期的6起特保案

据张涛介绍,从美国贸易法“421条款”生效至今,美国针对中国产品发起的特保措施案件(即“421调查”)已有6起。这6起特保调查案都发生在布什任职总统期间。

2002年8月19日,美国国际贸易委员会(ITC)应美国一家小规模的生产企业的申请,对原产于中国的椅座轴承致动器进行特保措施调查,也是首起 特保调查。而该产品中国在2001年对美国出口额仅为17万美元。02年10月18日,美国ITC裁定中国对美出口的椅座升降装置对美国相关产业构成了市 场扰乱,并建议实施配额限制。为此,中方与美方进行了磋商,到2003年1月17日,美国总统布什决定不采取救济措施,中美首起特保调查案以中国企业未受 损害而告终。

2002年11月28日,美国三家钢丝衣架生产企业向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的钢丝衣架立案进行特保措施调查。经过两个月时间的调 查,03年1月27日,ITC裁定中国对美国出口的钢丝衣架对美国相关产业构成了市场扰乱,并提出加征关税的救济建议。4月25日,美国总统布什否决了采 取救济措施的建议。

2003年特保调查案也发生了两起。6月5日,美国“保护美国维修市场用刹车盘、刹车鼓生产商联合会”向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的刹车 盘、刹车鼓立案进行特保措施调查。8月5日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的刹车盘和刹车鼓未对美国相关产业构成市场扰乱,并结束调查。30天后,美国有四家公 司向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产于中国的球墨铸铁管件立案进行特保措施调查。10月16日,ITC裁定中国对美国球墨铸铁管件出口不存在“紧急情势 ”;12月4日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的球墨铸铁管件对美国相关产业构成市场扰乱,为此,中方与美方进行了磋商。2004年3月3日,美国总统布什做出 了不采取救济措施的最终决定。

2004年至2005年各有一起特保调查案,其中04年的弹簧案张涛亲自参与过。04年1月6日,美国弹簧生产商协会向ITC提起申诉,要求对原产 于中国的床用内置弹簧组立案进行特保措施调查。经过短短2个多月的取证和应对调查,3月8日,ITC裁定中国对美出口的床用内置弹簧组未对美国相关产业构 成市场扰乱。2005年,根据421条款,美国国际贸易委员会对中国发起一起环状焊接管特保措施调查案,被ITC裁定构成市场扰乱。但在12月30日,美 国总统布什也最终否决了采取特保措施。

需警惕危害

尽管过去发生的6起特保调查没有对中国企业产生负面影响和实质损害,但中国出口企业切不可对此轻视。张涛分析认为,美国对中国发起的特保调查案具有三大明显的危害特征:

一是申诉和调查的时效速度非常快,从特保申请到特保措施的出台不超过半年。 “一旦ITC认定市场扰乱成立,美国总统可以很快就采取限制进口措施,在此情况下,中国企业很容易被打个措手不及。”张涛表示。而反倾销调查和反补贴调查 从立案到采取反倾销措施,一般都在12个月-18个月之间。

二是效果明显。如果美国总统决定采取特保措施,马上就会增加关税、实施非关税措施(如数量限制)或两者并用来限制进口,中国相关产业的出口量会立即受限或受到征税处罚。

第三个危害也是影响最大的危害,即容易引发“多米诺骨牌效应”。以美国“421条款”为代表的特保条款被称作是国际商务领域的“非典型肺炎”,它不 同于传统的贸易救济措施。如果某个WTO成员因特保调查成立而实施特保措施,其他WTO成员就可以“贸易转移”为由,对我国同一种出口产品实施连锁特保措 施,引发多米诺骨牌效应,进而使我国整体出口环境恶化。

美国产业界提起的6起特保调查案尽管都被否决,使其对中国产品实施“特保措施”的目的落空,但421条款的威胁却依然存在。奥巴马在去年美国的总统 竞选中曾批评布什政府在中国对美出口产品上屡次否决采取特保措施,并称特保调查应该被使用。今年2月份,美国在7870亿美元的经济振兴方案中曾有“购买 美国货”条款,虽因全球强烈舆论而将此条款作了软化处理,但不排除奥巴马政府在此后的具体政策执行过程中启用相关的贸易保护措施并对中国出口产生实质上的 损害影响。

张涛表示,中国承诺允许其他WTO成员在入世后12年内,其他WTO成员可以使用特保措施机制条款来限制中国进口产品。那么在12年大限即将结束的 2013年12月10日之前,特别是在目前全球经济不景气的情况下,美国(和其他国家)随时都可能利用421条款对我国出口产品实施进口限制措施,以保护 其本国企业利益。

不管当前这起轮胎特保调查案的结果如何,张涛认为中国企业和政府在这个特别敏感时期需要时刻警惕高度关注并积极应对,以避免由当前的轮胎特保调查案 引发连锁损害效应。张涛表示,目前美国产业和中国商务部都在紧密地观望轮胎特保案的走向,如果奥巴马政府有意通过此案改变美国政府在特保调查中的一贯做 法,中国应该怎么办?

根据自己参与应诉弹簧特保案的经验,张涛建议从以下5个方面来应对解决:一是涉案的中国相关企业答问卷,企业要积极配合起诉方的调查。二是商协会要 发挥起行业协会组织的作用,组织产业积极应诉,并同美国申请产业进行会谈协商,争取撤案。三是当行业发生特保调查案时,(行业协会、企业)要及时把相关信 息反馈给政府,由中国政府出面沟通,给美国政府足够的政治压力,同时营造一种强势的舆论。四是律师和经济法学专家共同对美国产业状况、中国进口及受损因果 关系等进行分析。比如深入判断美国是否遭受损害以及遭受损害的因果关系分析,研究美国轮胎产业是否因我国的出口而受损,若受损是否因进口我国轮胎激增造成 的,同时也要判断中国进口产品是否激增了,什么叫激增,如何界定激增等等,给政府提供积极翔实的数据支持。五是中国企业要通过多种方式获得美国进口商、下 游产业和最终用户(消费者)的支持,共同游说美国政府做出有利中国的结果。

张涛

北京嘉润道和律师事务所合伙人、律师,实战派反倾销法律专家,毕业于对外经济贸易大学,法律硕士。曾负责并参与了中国反倾销条例和规章的起草制定以 及中国反倾销调查制度的建设,受聘于中国商务部作为第三方参加WTO有关反倾销法律的争端解决,并代理中国商务部应对美国、欧盟和土耳其对华的纺织品特保 调查,具有丰富的反倾销特保调查案经验和美国337调查案经验。

ECIPE Internship Programme

From my friends at the ECIPE.

ECIPE has an internship programme (internships are salaried) and accepts every semester two candidates. Candidates should have a Master's degree in economics (international economics/trade economics), international political economy, European integration, or an equivalent discipline relevant for ECIPE's research profile. We are particularly looking for candidates with an excellent academic record and with a strong interest for a future career in academia, journalism, or policy making. Interns will participate in all of ECIPE's work and will undergo a training programme that is designed after their future career interests. Interns assist ECIPE scholars with research assistance and participate in research programmes. Interns should have excellent writing skills and should be fluent in English. The application should include:

• Letter of interest explaining why you would like to do an internship with ECIPE (1 page);
• CV with two academic references;
• MA/MSc dissertation in English (if your MA/MSc dissertation will be finished soon after the deadline, send your BA/BSc dissertation and a research outline of the MA/MSc dissertation).

Applications for the fall internships (starting September/October) should be sent to ECIPE (info@ecipe.org) no later than June 15.

Friday 1 May 2009

Lamy: WTO in 2012 - Stronger WTO, Stronger Secretariat

On his reappointment as the WTO DG, Pascal Lamy outlined his plan for the WTO for the next 4 years. Below is his full speech, which emphases added by me.



Lamy: "Strengthening the WTO as the global trade body"

Director-General Pascal Lamy, in presenting to the General Council his vision for the WTO for the next four years, said on 29 April 2009 that "the WTO, as a living organism, should continue to improve its capacity to rapidly react to global challenges, as we are seeing in the current crisis, and to contribute to devising solutions to those challenges. The reinforcement of the multilateral trading system, in particular through the conclusion of the Doha Round, should be our guiding light. In the constellation of global governance, let's work together to see the WTO star shining ever brighter." His presentation was made in the context of the Director-General appointment process.


Statement by Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General

Mr Chairman,

Thank you very much for the opportunity to express my views and for providing an occasion for a dialogue with all members about the next four years. I hope that this process allows us to distance ourselves, albeit briefly, from our day-to-day concerns, and to look at the bigger picture.

As the poet Carl Sandburg once said: "a politician should have three hats. One for throwing into the ring, one for talking through and one for pulling rabbits out of if elected." The good news is that I have the hat. But the bad news is that we do not yet have a rabbit to pull out of the hat!

Jokes aside, I approach this exercise very much in the same spirit that I did in 2005; that is, remaining at the service of all WTO members and contributing to the strengthening of this Organization.

Let me start by reiterating my deep belief in the primary purpose of the WTO, which is to open trade for the benefit of all. The pursuit of openness, the guarantee of the most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory treatment by and among members, and a commitment to transparency in the conduct of its activities, remain our founding political values.

I remain convinced that the gradual opening of domestic markets to international trade, with justifiable exceptions or with adequate flexibilities, allows the achievement of sustainable development, raising people's welfare, reducing poverty, and fostering peace and stability.

But this does not mean that the benefits of rules-based trade opening accrue automatically to everyone. Hence the notion of a "Geneva consensus", which I enunciated in this same room in 2005. It is about trade opening but it is also about proper domestic and international policies, which help translate more open trade into real, increased and perceived benefits for our citizens.

We are living in a time of crisis. Its full social impact is still to come and it will inevitably create political pressures. And it is precisely now, when protectionist temptations abound, that the value of the multilateral trading system is all the more apparent to us. The GATT-WTO system of global trade rules patiently constructed over the last 60 years is first and foremost a provider of confidence for economic operators. And, as the crisis has shown, confidence is today the missing link to bring the world back onto a path of growth.

Therefore, our main objective for the years to come, as I see it, is to strengthen the role of the WTO as the global trade body. This means making the WTO more development-friendly, more "user-friendly", so that its benefits are felt by all, large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak.

Our core business is opening markets and designing trade rules. This is and will remain our unfinished business. Our task is far from over.

If we agree on this overall objective, which I believe we all do, how can we increase our chances of achieving it?

Based on the experience of the last four years and on the consultations I have had with many of you in recent weeks, there are four areas which, in my view, we should work to improve. These four areas are: negotiations; implementation; coherence; and outreach.

Delivering on the negotiations

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the WTO is more than its negotiations. But delivering on the negotiating mandate of the Doha Round remains the litmus test of our collective ability to strengthen the global trading system. This is why I believe that concluding the Doha Development Round is and should remain our number one priority.

Beyond the trade-offs required to conclude the Doha Round and also beyond the market access that it will bring, lies its hugely important systemic value. The biggest prize in the Doha Round is the certainty, predictability and stability it will bring to global trade. It is in a moment of crisis, such as the one we are witnessing today, that the value of this insurance policy increases.

The hard fact is that concluding the Doha Round is difficult precisely because its results will be meaningful: this Round is two or three times greater than previous ones, in terms of cuts and commitments. Also, this is a Round focused on benefits for developing countries — this is a true Development Round. If measured in terms of duties foregone, two-thirds of the potential benefits of tariff and subsidies cuts resulting from this Round will accrue to developing countries' exports.

What we need to do as of now is to reset the process at a political level, building on where we left it last year.

We have walked along the Doha Round path for seven years now and we are 80 per cent of the way there. We have done it together, with a bottom-up, inclusive process. A lot has been achieved — if you look back from where we started, there is a fairly long list of issues where views have converged. I believe the time is ripe to start taking the negotiations to the last phase; i.e. to run the last mile.

Looking beyond Doha, there are many new ideas floating around on potential areas for future work. Many of these have also come up in my consultations with you. Take climate change, where I am convinced that the first step should be a multilateral agreement embracing all major emitters that we all hope to see emerge at Copenhagen. Issues relating to food security, energy, labour, competition, investment or financial protectionism, however defined, are also in the air.

My own sense is that our capacity to project ourselves into the future depends on our capacity to make the present happen. These issues do not belong in the current agenda. Obviously nothing prevents us from thinking about the future but I believe serious work on any future topic should commence when the finish line of the Doha Round is firmly in sight.

Let me mention two areas which are part of our current mandate and which, in my view, deserve more of our attention: Regional Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin.

On RTAs, it is difficult to see why such deep concessions and commitments are undertaken today in the context of preferential agreements, without any consequences in the multilateral context. We all know this is a complex issue and that there are differences between RTAs aiming at deep regional integration and other free trade agreements. But, if we are serious about the prevalence of the Most-Favoured-Nation principle, we should collectively think about some way of gradually "multilateralising" concessions made in free trade agreements. Food for thought for Article XXIV negotiators.

On Rules of Origin, the proliferation of different regimes — regional, bilateral or even unilateral — needs, in my view, to be addressed head-on, in order to simplify the lives of trade and economic operators.

These two examples — RTAs and Rules of Origin — show that the WTO's current agenda is anything but old-fashioned. A lot of what we do today was already in the agenda of the Uruguay Round, even in the Tokyo Round to be more precise! But the fact is that they remain as relevant, if not more so, for economic operators today.

There are also a number of ideas being floated as far as the negotiating processes are concerned. Many have been explored in the Sutherland Report as well as in the Report of the Warwick Commission.

We currently operate within three constraints: decision-making by consensus, all negotiating items bundled into a single undertaking and a bottom-up negotiating process.

I do not think the "consensus about consensus" should be reopened. Taking decisions by consensus increases the legitimacy of agreements reached in an international forum, which is necessary and welcome, as the degree of legitimacy decreases with distance from domestic political processes.

The question then is how to build consensus. Resorting to the well-known concentric circles' approach is probably the only efficient method available. But it demands a rigorous transparency commitment by all: everyone must do his/her part. We must recognize that there is not yet enough transparency in the way we currently work — hence, there is room for improvement.

We also need to find ways to move faster to the centre of gravity on the negotiating topics, to increase efficiency. Here, in my view, there is something to be learnt from the negotiating processes of other international forums.

Sectoral and plurilateral agreements or concepts such as "critical mass" have already been tested. But again, I believe this should not be the focus of our work at this stage.

Improving implementation

The second area of future focus should be improving implementation of existing agreements. When one looks at the functions of the WTO, there is a striking contrast between the sophistication of the negotiations, the solidity of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the fragility of surveillance and transparency, which is nevertheless one of the pillars of the multilateral trading system.

The mandates for notifications and peer review are there, but in my view not enough attention and resources have been given to their implementation. A certain lack of overall vision and of analytical capacity handicaps the surveillance function of the WTO.

There are, however, some bright spots. Progress has been made in transparency in Regional Trade Agreements, for example. And with the monitoring of the measures taken in response to the crisis we have shown that we can collectively make a more muscular use of these mechanisms. But many committees register a poor record of notifications and — most importantly — of their quality and examination. As one of you told me the other day, we have been collectively a bit lazy in this field.

The challenge is how to improve this. We could make better use of technical assistance, focus more on the capacity of members to comply with their notification obligations and better prepare them for a more effective peer review. We could better operationalize Trade Policy Reviews. We could also redesign notification formats so that they become multipurpose. An improved surveillance process would surely increase trust in the system and avoid jamming the dispute settlement mechanism, through an "early warning" system.

As for dispute settlement, my sense is that overall it is working well. In addition to what is being negotiated in the DSU review process, there are some areas for improvement, such as reducing the administrative costs for the Secretariat — the length of submissions and annexes to be translated is one issue to be tackled — and addressing peaks of activity.

Compliance with dispute settlement decisions is also an area to be given attention. As is the participation of developing countries in dispute settlement, where I believe that a boost to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law would surely be welcome. And also how to make better and more frequent use of good offices, mediation and arbitration, procedures which are provided for in our existing rules.

Building on coherence

The third area I would alike to flag is how to ensure more coherence both internally and externally.

Starting with the Secretariat: my view is that, in spite of past progress, there remains a need to further de-compartmentalize divisions, improve internal communication, enhance mobility of staff, make use of task forces - such as the one we have for crisis monitoring - or establish pools of experts, for activities such as Trade Policy Reviews, technical assistance and accessions. We should also have more informal sessions and seminars with members, to look across areas covered by the WTO.

Externally, the WTO is one of the planets in the global governance galaxy and its know-how can be leveraged even more to tackle global governance challenges. The main ingredients of global governance are efficiency and legitimacy. The key to combine these two elements is coherence.

We have used our convening power to ensure a more coherent approach to different issues in the international trade and economic agenda. In the last four years we have strengthened the functioning of the explicit coherence mandate that the WTO has with the World Bank and with the International Monetary Fund. But we have also worked to expand the WTO's coherence with other international and regional organizations. I intend to continue working along these lines.

Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework are clear examples of that. Monitoring of the measures taken in the context of the current crisis is another example. Trade finance and the recent initiatives to convene stakeholders at the WTO to address this issue globally are also examples of our capacity to promote a coherent approach to global problems. The same can be said of the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF). We should build on this in the future, and pay more attention to the regional level, which is becoming more and more relevant, including for our trade-related technical assistance.

We are engaged in joint research with other international organizations, such as the ILO, the OECD, UNCTAD and Regional Development Banks. A joint study on trade and climate change jointly produced by the WTO with UNEP will soon be published.

On a more macro level, the building of bridges with the UN system, with trade being part of the Millennium Development Goals' endeavour and through my own involvement in the Chief Executives' Board, should also help to improve coherence in our work with the United Nations family.

Boosting outreach

This is one area where, despite our efforts, a lot of work remains to be done. There continues to be a disproportion between the activities we have amongst ourselves - over 7,000 meetings taking place in the Centre William Rappard every year - and the intensity of interaction with our environment and the public.

Starting with our own circle: there is room for improvement in the interaction with small and non-resident delegations. A review of the proportion of training resources offered to these members should be done, so as to ensure that their needs are addressed.

Then, reaching out to non-members, we have accessions, an area that many of you have pointed out as needing focus in the coming years. There is a certain malaise amongst acceding members, as they feel that the bar for accession seems to continuously rise. There are specific concerns on the part of LDCs on the use of the guidelines for their accession to the WTO.

Accession is a complex process, necessitating both domestic ownership and capacity, which require hard work in many acceding members. However, I believe that there may be merit in devoting more focused efforts as well as ensuring greater political attention to accessions, in particular those of Least Developed Countries. I for my part also intend to do so when this is required.

Turning now to our external stakeholders — NGOs, parliaments, staffers, academics, business — there is also a need to strengthen networking and increase transparency.

In the past four years, we have worked to enhance our engagement with civil society. We have launched a pilot accreditation project of local NGOs to facilitate their access to the WTO premises during Ministerial Conferences, Trade Negotiation Committees, and General Councils. We have devolved a greater portion of the organizational aspects of the WTO's Public Forum to civil society, allowing civil society to itself shape the Forum. I myself have regularly engaged with NGOs both in Geneva and during my travels, acknowledging their input in our work.

We have made better use of our website and of electronic dissemination, through webcasts. We have strengthened our outreach to academics, in particular those in developing countries. Just this week we have launched the WTO Essay Award for young economists.

But there is more to do. In my consultations with civil society ahead of this meeting, a number of ideas were raised. For example, a greater opening of our Trade Policy Reviews or greater engagement of civil society on the ground during WTO Technical Assistance missions. These ideas are worth exploring together.

Special attention, in my view, should be given to parliamentarians and staffers, who hold the keys to deciding agreements at the end of the day and adopting legislation in a WTO-consistent manner.

Our most challenging outreach problem, though, remains with the general public. The WTO has very high notoriety — but low popularity, even if this is changing, in particular in developing countries. The WTO is too complex to be user-friendly. Communicating WTO is like telling people that Lord Jones has died when they did not even know that Lord Jones was alive! Its complexity is a handicap — something which deserves serious thought. We need to think how we communicate in a friendlier way.

We have improved our WTO website, which is very well-rated amongst surfers of the web, but more can be done, using all three languages.

In sum, we need to change gear. The classic asymmetry in the politics of trade - the many who benefit are silent, the few who suffer are vocal - means that the burden of proof is on us. It is for us to make the case for open markets and better regulation. We need to have a better radar picture of media reporting on the WTO. Public perceptions continue to be too dotted, especially in the non- English speaking world. There is a need for further engagement with domestic and regional media. And the WTO Secretariat cannot do it alone; we need to work on this together.

A Secretariat at the service of members

Let me now turn to the Secretariat. It is small but beautiful. Comparatively small in size and therefore capable of rapidly adjusting to changes in priorities, in workload as in tasks. Beautiful because it is full of powerful intellects and efficient professionals and support staff devoted to servicing you.

My overall objective, as the head of the Secretariat, is to enhance its capacity of providing support to members. For that, there is a need to keep modernising the Secretariat, while keeping it frugal. Version.3 changes have increased productivity — and will continue to do so.

As to recruitment, I will continue to adhere to the principles of expertise, merit and diversity. In the last four years and even within the very limited overall staff turnover, we have increased the number of nationalities of our staff: we have added eight new nationalities from developing and Least Developed Countries. Sixty per cent of staff recruited at junior professional level have come from developing countries and LDCs. Half of them had gone through one of our internship programmes. Two-thirds of our internships went to developing-country and LDC young professionals.

But there is more to be achieved in terms of improving diversity, including on gender mainstreaming, as well as in improving our internships for young professionals, as suggested by some of you, in particular from developing and Least Developed Countries. I will continue to advance this.

We have worked to make the WTO a greener organization by developing a plan to cut down emissions. In this context I believe that we could work together to use more technology and reduce the paper flow to Delegations. As far as the Secretariat is concerned, I intend to pursue the objective of achieving a paperless Secretariat by 2012.

On the building, our aim is to keep the renovation costs within the envelope which has been agreed by members. The renovation works have already started in the south wing, with the date for the end of the entire works being Autumn 2012. By then, we will have renovated the Centre William Rappard and built its extension in the current south parking — local political specificities permitting of course. I count on the support and well-known lobbying skills of you all to engage in this important local campaign !

There will be the unavoidable disturbance during the works which we will strive to keep to a minimum. There will also be difficulties with parking, even if the Secretariat has vacated all but a handful of parking slots on site for your use. In advance I count on your understanding for the disturbances during the renovation and construction period.

Also on the Secretariat, I believe we have to increase its services, its support and its analytical capacity. The issue cuts across all areas of improvement I have identified.

We cannot do our work better without seriously increasing our research, analytical and dissemination capacity. We need to work further on our databases, in terms of accessibility and interoperability. But simply producing and publishing data is not enough. We need to be able to better analyze and share it. The WTO needs to become more of a reference on trade knowledge, i.e. on the analysis of global trade policy data and statistics. We need to move from production to interpretation, from raw numbers to trade intelligence. And again, this is key to all areas: negotiations, monitoring, dispute settlement, technical cooperation and outreach.

Also, we need to continue operating as a forward-looking radar on trade issues, but in a more systematic way. We need to be fully aware of new issues and examine potential future obstacles to trade, to be at the cutting edge of awareness of the shaping factors of world trade, to continue to better serve you. This requires efficient networking — and hence a stronger base in the WTO, so as to be able to provide members with simulations, quantifications, scenarios and options.

The changes introduced in the Secretariat so far have increased our efficiency, but we are working at near-full capacity. To be able to further improve our services to you, to be able to respond to requests for analytical work, we will need to increase our resources. Staff will have to be strengthened with more economists, lawyers and communication specialists. There is scope for redeployment which I will continue to do. But my own sense is that this will not be enough.

My approach to our budget has been a simple one: the budget is a forecast, not an authorization to spend. If there is money left, we give it back — which we have done. And the introduction of an activity-based budget will make us more accountable to you. We will have an occasion to discuss this in our next bi-annual budget. I count on your support for this.

One issue of particular concern is the current situation of the WTO staff pension plan. The plan, as you are aware, is of the collective responsibility of WTO staff and members. Apart from the negative impact of the crisis on the plan, it also suffers from an actuarial deficit, which should be addressed urgently. I trust that members will give due attention to solving this problem in the near future.

While on budgetary issues, I have a concern with the issue of arrears, in particular those of our poorest members. Some thought must be given to how they could start from a clean slate. Another concern is the increase of trust funds, which implies costly administrative work. We should seriously consider whether there is scope for the integration of at least some of the current activities provided by trust funds into the regular budget.

Let me close by addressing the question of WTO ministerial meetings, which many of you have raised during our consultations. We should de-dramatize ministerial meetings, make them a more regular exercise, where WTO activities are reviewed across the board, to ascertain the level of satisfaction of members with the running of WTO activities and to address priorities at a political level. We have not had a ministerial meeting since 2005 and my own sense is that we should not close 2009 without one. A regular ministerial meeting is one thing; ministerial involvement in negotiations is another. We should not confuse the two.

In conclusion, Mr Chairman, no major surgery needed in the WTO. No major overhaul of the system is required. But rather a long to-do list to strengthen the global trading system. I am ready to do my part and to assist members in achieving the objectives of this Organization. The WTO, as a living organism, should continue to improve its capacity to rapidly react to global challenges, as we are seeing in the current crisis, and to contribute to devising solutions to those challenges.

The reinforcement of the multilateral trading system, in particular through the conclusion of the Doha Round, should be our guiding light. In the constellation of global governance, let's work together to see the WTO star shining ever brighter.

I thank you Mr Chairman.