New Article in the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly

I have published a paper on The Economic Crisis, Protectionism and China's New Trade Policy in the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, one of the leading policy journals in Greater China. Below is the capsule summary of the article. Interested readers can get the journal from all major news-stands in HK or the Journal directly. 

經濟危機、保護主義和中國的外貿新政

 

中國在入世至今，走過了一條從被動的接受國際規則，到善於利用現有規則維護本國利益的道路。能夠在短短八年間從一個門外漢變成熟練運用世貿規則的高手，中國的成就相當可觀。但是，擺在中國還有一個更重要的挑戰，那就是學會利用WTO這個平台制定反映中國自身利益的規則。

Interview with Zhou Xiaoyan

Mdm Zhou Xiaoyan, Director General of the Bureau of Fair Trade, was recently featured in an online interview on MOFCOM's website. There are some some interesting info from her interview. The full interview is available here.

1. So far, 79 countries have recognized China's market economy status. Assuming almost all (apparently Russia is not) are WTO Members, this is more than half of the 153 Members of the WTO. This will build up the pressure on other WTO Members to recognize the MES of China.

承认中国的市场经济地位，既符合WTO公平贸易的原则，也有助于拓展中国与其他贸易伙伴间的双边贸易，实现互利双赢。截至目前，已有新西兰、俄罗斯、南非、巴西、澳大利亚、韩国、埃及等79个国家承认中国完全市场经济地位，加拿大也推定中国所有行业为市场导向行业。中国希望有关国家能够客观公正地认识中国市场经济体制建设所取得的成就，积极考虑并尽早承认中国的市场经济地位。  

2. Up to end of 2009, China has initiated 62 ADP investigations, 3 SCV investigation, and 1 safeguard investigations.

从1997年我首起反倾销案至2009年底，应国内产业申请，我国调查机关对共进口产品发起反倾销调查62起，反补贴调查3起，保障措施调查1起。特别是2009年6月，经严格的法律程序和实体审核，商务部对美国进口的取向电工钢发起“双反”调查，这也是我国首例反补贴调查。开启反补贴调查使我挤身少数能运用WTO规则允许的反倾销、反补贴和保障措施全部三种贸易救济措施的成员之列，丰富了我国贸易救济调查的实践，增强了我们全面运用WTO贸易救济措施维护产业安全的能力。

First sermon in the new year from Pastor Lamy

Here are some more interesting thoughts from the "Dalai Lamy", sorry, should be Pascal Lamy. I'm sure some people will get excited if you have the patience to finish this long speech, but the trader lawyer inside me (as many other trade lawyers probably will) has already started asking: "Is that possible? Aren't the WTO DSB supposed to decide cases on the basis of 'covered agreements', which, no matter how desirable it might sound, do not include the UDHR, ICCPR or the ICESCR? Can you really use trade rules to strengthen human rights? Aren't the two regimes supposed to be parallel universes like Pandora and Earth, where human rights is respected on one but not the other?"

On a separate note, I bet 100 THB that, with speeches like this keep flowing during the rest of his DG term, Lamy has a pretty decent chance of getting nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize after his term. 

The full text of the latest "Lamon" is reproduced below, with emphases added by me, and my own comments in italicized font in brackets. 

"Towards Shared Responsibility and Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic Policy"
Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy, Co-organized by the International Council on Human Rights and Realizing Rights, Geneva, 13 January 2010


The last time we discussed this issue was in the cathedral of Geneva with Desmond Tutu. Putting together the issues of trade and human rights may seem odd. For many, trade is the villain. It is a symbol of mercantilism, capitalism, the tool through which powerful multinational corporations impose their law over human beings, impairing their social, economic and cultural rights. The history of the relationship between trade and human rights is a history of suspicion, and to some extent of deliberate reciprocal ignorance. 

Yet, trade goes hand in hand with human rights. Trade presupposes human interaction, respect and understanding. If conducted with respect, "trade polishes and softens the most barbarous mores", to quote Montesquieu and his theory of "doux commerce".

One too often forgets that human rights and trade rules, including WTO rules, are based on the same values: individual freedom and responsibility, non-discrimination, rule of law, and welfare through peaceful cooperation among individuals. Not only are they based on the same fundamental values; they are also the result of common concerns. Both human rights and global trade rules were considered a key element of the post-World War II order, a rampart against totalitarianism. It is no coincidence that the seeds of the multilateral trading system were planted at the same time as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was being drafted in the mid-1940s. Both were seen as indispensable to world peace. In spite of these common underpinnings, for decades the interaction between the trade and human rights communities seemed to be governed by distrust.

And yet, human rights and trade are mutually supportive. Human rights are essential to the good functioning of the multilateral trading system, and trade and WTO rules contribute to the realization of human rights.

What role do human rights play in trade? First, civil and political rights are a key ingredient of good governance, which in turn is essential to the proper conduct of trade relations. Freedom of expression, for example, brings transparency, one of the core principles of the world trading system. Secondly, social, economic and cultural rights, often seen as the main victims of globalization and of the opening of markets, are important ingredients for successful trade liberalization. I will come back to this point in a few minutes.

How can trade help promote human rights? I would start by noting that trade measures are the most commonly used instrument in developed countries to put pressure on states violating human rights. (Does this mean that the WTO sanctions such blatant violations of trade rules? Does this mean that trade rules have to be ignored or even breached so that human rights can be restored? Wouldn't this point to inherent conflict rather than complementarity between the two?) 

But more importantly, trade is a means to an end; and the end is raising the standards and conditions of living of all. The objective of sustainable development features prominently as one of the objectives of the WTO. Trade negotiators chose to include it in the preamble of the WTO Agreement (yes the preamble rather than the main text, which means it is not enforceable). How is this goal achieved? The opening of markets creates efficiency, stimulates growth and helps spur development, thereby contributing to the implementation of the fundamental human rights that are social and economic rights. One could almost claim that trade is human rights in practice! 

The reduction of trade barriers in agriculture, enhanced market access for agricultural products and the gradual decrease in subsidies provided by rich countries to their farmers, for example, all contribute to the same objective: the implementation of the right to food for all.

But let me immediately discard a misconception that is unfortunately too widely spread. The primary vocation of the WTO is to regulate, not to deregulate trade as is often thought. By putting in place rules to regulate trade flows and remove trade distortions, the WTO aims to create a global level playing field, where fairness is the rule and where the rights of individual members are safeguarded.

I would note, in this regard, that the case law of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism acknowledged that international trade law could not be interpreted "in clinical isolation" from international law in general. And, incidentally, how could the WTO &mdash created in 1994 by an international legal instrument — be immune to the rules of the general international law from which it derives its mission and its very existence?

Of course, trade rules are not perfect. They may, in some cases, have unintended consequences on human rights. Some claimed so, for example, with respect to intellectual property rights. I sense, however, a growing awareness among trade experts of the importance of human rights and of the role trade can play in promoting and anchoring such rights. The concerns sparked by certain provisions of the TRIPS [Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights] Agreement led trade negotiators to agree, in 2005, to amend the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access of developing countries deprived of domestic pharmaceutical production capability to affordable medicines. Similarly, discussions are underway about the possible protection of folklore and traditional knowledge.

But let me go back to the question of trade, development, and human rights. While trade can promote development and contribute to the reinforcement of human rights, it is not a panacea. Trade liberalization can entail social costs. To be successful, the opening of markets requires solid social policies to redistribute wealth or provide safeguards to the men and women whose living conditions have been disrupted by evolving trade rules and trade patterns.

This is what I have called the "Geneva consensus", under which the opening of markets is necessary to our collective well-being, but does not suffice in itself.

It does not suffice unless strong safety nets help correct the imbalances between winners and losers at the national level. It does not suffice unless the countries which do not enjoy sufficient human, technical, and financial resources to build the necessary infrastructure or to put in place such safety nets domestically are assisted by the international community. Hence the importance of the WTO mandate of Aid for Trade.

For trade to act as a positive vector for the reinforcement of human rights, a coordinated international effort is needed. A coherent approach, which integrates trade and human rights policy goals, should be developed. Progress can no longer be achieved by acting in an isolated manner. Coherence should become our guiding principle in fostering development and human rights: coherence between the local and the global, between the world of trade and the world of human rights, between the WTO as an institution and the various organizations active in the field of human rights.

Today's world may be flat, to paraphrase Thomas Friedman, but it is not united. It is, on the contrary, more fragmented than ever. The wind of globalization, which has been blowing during the past few decades, has dispersed our energies. We now need to bring them together and act in a coordinated way.

This responsibility lies with all of us. It is the responsibility of the members of the WTO, which are practically all party to either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to uphold their human rights obligations together with the obligations to which they have subscribed within the WTO Agreement. But it is also the responsibility of the WTO, of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights — which is the custodian of human rights treaties — and of organizations such as the International Council on Human Rights and Realizing Rights to work to institutionalize the relations between the trade and human rights communities. It is our responsibility to coordinate our actions in a meaningful and efficient manner to ensure that trade does not impair human rights, but rather strengthens them. I am aware of the challenge this represents, of the change in mindset this requires.

By having invited me to this event today, a first step has been crossed, and I thank you for having taken this initiative. My hope, as Sir Winston Churchill said, is that "this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

Thank you for your attention.

Shaffer and Pollack, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods

Opinio Juris has hosted a discussion on the interesting new book by Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford, 2009). Joining in with guest commentaries are Sungjoon Cho and Rebecca Bratspies. While the book focuses mainly on the GMO dispute between the US and EU, I find many of the key points explored in the book (see below) well worthy of further exploring. These include topics such as regulatory conflicts between different jurisdictions, interactions between interest groups and policy makers, roles of international regimes in handling such conflicts.

One thing that immediately came to my mind was the tainted milk scandal in China in 2008. The way the Chinese government handled the case is in marked contrast to the approach taken by either the US or the EU on the GMO issue. Among the three, the Chinese approach is probably the least desirable approach. That is why I have arguedthat, at least for a case of such magnitude, international intervention is justified. 

On the GMO issue itself, I feel that it has not received the attention it deserves in China. With billions of Chinese eating something that is grown on a technology of which the full implications are far from clear, I think the average Chinese must at least be given the right to get more information, even if they might not have the right to more choices. 

Below are the detailed summary by Shaffer and Pollack on their new book, with emphases added by me:

The Interaction of International and Domestic Law: Lessons from the Conflict over Genetically Modified Foods

by Greg Shaffer and Mark Pollack

As its title suggests, When Cooperation Fails has two distinct aims. The specific empirical aim is to provide a definitive and theoretically informed account of one of the most bitter and politically charged international disputes of the past two decades, between the United States and the European Union over the regulation of genetically modified foods and crops. Our theoretical aim, however, goes far beyond the specifics of the GMO case: indeed, we seek to contribute to literatures in international law and international relations that identify the sources of international regulatory and trade disputes, the obstacles to successful cooperation, the interaction of hard- and soft-law international regimes, and the role of WTO dispute settlement in managing conflict.

Our approach is interdisciplinary, drawing from international law and political science, and multi-level, examining the recursive interaction of domestic and international law and politics over time. We start by inquiring why the US and EU systems for risk regulation are so different in this area, then examine failed efforts to bridge these differences through transgovernmental networks and various multilateral regimes, and finally investigate how international law developments in these fragmented regimes have fed back into domestic legal systems in the US and EU as well as in emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil, affecting the future of genetically modified crops and foods. Our central arguments can be boiled down to five key points.

First, on the domestic law front, we apply theories of comparative law and politics that attribute differences in domestic risk regulation to differences in organized interests, political institutions, culture and ideas, and contingent events. We find that the best explanation for the differences lies not in "essentialist" forms of culture or regulatory approaches (such as US and European attitudes toward food, risk, technology or the precautionary principle), nor in institutions alone (such as US specialized agencies compared to European political processes), but in the ability of interest groups to capitalize on pre-existing cultural and institutional differences, with an important role played by contingent events such as the European food-safety scandals of the 1990s. We contend that the stark differences in the US and EU regulatory systems were not preordained by interest-group, institutional or cultural configurations of the two sides, but were the result of multiple and, to some extent, contingent causes. Nonetheless, we show that the differences have become entrenched over time and are now strongly path-dependent and resistant to change.

Second, turning to the international level, we draw upon a growing body of international relations and international legal scholarship that focuses on the promise of regulation through transnational networks, with a particular emphasis on the prospect of "deliberation" as a form of decision-making in which governmental and non-governmental actors put aside fixed positions and negotiating tactics in favor of a collective search for better understanding and better policy. We find, however, that the record of transatlantic deliberation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has largely been one of failure. Deliberation, we argue, is a hothouse flower that flourishes only under restrictive conditions. The sharp disagreements, intense politicization, and distributive conflicts that characterize agricultural biotechnology have all prevented US and EU policymakers from engaging in a joint deliberative search for the best policy in this area.

Third, we contend that the record of multilateral cooperation (undertaken within overlapping regimes such as the WTO, the Convention on Biodiversity, the OECD, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission), has been similarly limited, characterized largely by strategic maneuvering by both sides to "export" their own standards and their own principles for risk regulation, and to "forum shop" among the regimes most likely to produce each side's favored outcomes, imposing most of the costs of adapting to new global norms on others. We argue that cooperation has been frustrated in practice by the existence of severe distributive conflict between the two sides, which has given rise to overlapping and (sometimes purposefully) inconsistent regimes for trade, the environment, and food safety. Furthermore, while a growing amount of scholarship has addressed the roles of "soft" law (which is formally non-binding) and "hard" law (which is formally binding and enforceable) as complementary and mutually reinforcing means for international problem-solving, we find that hard and soft law regimes can interact antagonistically. More specifically, we argue, the interaction of overlapping regimes can serve to "harden" soft-law regimes like the Codex Alimentarius (which become intensely politicized rather than deliberative and technocratic), as well as "softening" hard-law regimes like the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism (where judicial interpretation is potentially complicated by links to neighboring regimes). The interaction of hard- and soft-law regimes, rather than progressively moving toward a new consensus, may instead perpetuate substantive deadlock over regulatory approaches, especially where conflicts involve powerful states.

Fourth, we suggest that, despite considerable risks, the United States' complaint before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has offered the prospect of some clarification and mutual accommodation that had hitherto eluded the two sides in other bilateral and multilateral fora. More specifically, we apply a comparative institutional analytic framework to examine the radically different institutional implications of the interpretive choices that the WTO judicial panel faced in the EU-Biotech case. We demonstrate how interpretive choices by a WTO judicial body can attempt to allocate decision-making to different institutional processes in which constituencies of different countries, with varying priorities, perceptions, and abilities to be heard, participate to varying and always imperfect degrees. We find that the WTO panel largely took a procedural approach in its decision, refusing to articulate a single substantive standard on GMO regulation, but instead insisting on certain procedural requirements that all states must observe in adopting their own domestic regulations. In the process, we contend, the WTO has empowered domestic political actors (such as the European Commission) with an interest in complying with WTO law, and, as a result, has encouraged regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to operate more transparently, taking into greater account the effects of their actions on third parties.

Fifth and finally, we return to the domestic level to assess whether several decades of discussion, negotiation, and litigation have resulted in significant reform and/or convergence of the two regulatory systems. We demonstrate that, despite some domestic changes on each side, the US and EU regulatory systems for agricultural biotechnology show few signs of real convergence toward a common regulatory model. There has, nonetheless, been some domestic change on both sides of the Atlantic, due at least in part to external pressures from international markets and international regimes. In the EU, the Commission and biotech companies have been somewhat empowered by international developments to resume approvals of new GM varieties after a long moratorium and to challenge member state bans against those already formally approved. On the US side, meanwhile, regulators have increased requirements for trials before the commercial release of many GM seeds so that these varieties, in fact, are treated distinctly from more conventional ones, despite official US proclamations to the contrary. Even in the absence of tightened regulation, moreover, US farmers have demonstrated a reluctance to adopt new GM foods and crops which they fear will be rejected in the EU and other large export markets. The overall picture, we argue, is one in which the two regulatory systems for GM foods and crops remain essentially polarized, but where key actors on both sides struggle to minimize the economic impacts and political tensions of persistent regulatory differences.

In sum, the story of the transatlantic GMO conflict is largely one of failed attempts at bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Yet our story is not a counsel of despair, for in addition to examining how and why cooperation fails, we address ways in which states and regimes can facilitate the ongoing management of regulatory conflict, and, over time, together with transnational market forces, influence national regulatory and commercial practices in a (somewhat) more accommodating manner. System friction between two entrenched regulatory systems is unlikely to be decisively settled in the near future, but the dispute can be managed, with key roles for international law and international institutions.

What happened in Copenhagen: The Chinese version

青山遮不住，毕竟东流去―温家宝总理出席哥本哈根气候变化会议纪实

新华社记者赵承　田帆　人民日报记者韦冬泽

2009/12/25

　　12月19日，在经历了复杂曲折的协商后，哥本哈根气候变化会议取得了重大积极成果，发表了《哥本哈根协议》，坚定维护了《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》所确立的基本框架和一系列原则，进一步明确了发达国家和发展中国家根据"共同但有区别的责任"原则及分别应当承担的义务和采取的行动，表达了国际社会在应对气候变化长期目标、资金、技术和行动透明度等问题上的共识。

　　从12月16日至12月18日，国务院总理温家宝在出席哥本哈根气候变化会议的近60个小时内，与有关国家领导人展开了密集的会谈和协商，力推谈判进程不断向前。随行采访的记者耳闻目睹了哥本哈根气候变化会议进程的跌宕起伏、协商谈判的艰辛曲折，更见证了温家宝总理以诚意、信心、决心和卓有成效的努力，充分展示中国谋发展、促合作、负责任的大国形象。

　　在哥本哈根气候变化会议领导人会议上，温家宝总理发表了重要演讲，宣示了中国政府的一贯主张，呼吁各方凝聚共识、加强合作，共同推进应对气候变化的历史进程；在会场内外错综复杂的形势下，温家宝总理迎难而上，积极行动，以最大的政治意愿和耐心，在与会各方中穿梭斡旋，沟通协调，尤其在会议面临可能无果而终的关键时刻，亲自出面与有关方面做了大量艰苦细致的工作，最终推动了《哥本哈根协议》的达成。

　　历史将铭记，中国政府为哥本哈根气候变化会议成功作出了重要贡献。

　　"慎重者，始若怯，终必勇"――在参加会议前，温家宝总理进行了周密的思考，为推动会议取得成果做了大量准备工作

　　近年来，围绕全球气候变暖问题，发展中国家同发达国家的交锋愈演愈烈。中国作为最大的发展中国家，在节能减排方面作出了巨大的努力，取得了显著成效。

　　11月26日，中国政府宣布控制温室气体排放的行动目标，到2020年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年下降40%至45%，受到国际舆论的广泛好评。同时宣布，温家宝总理出席哥本哈根气候变化会议。

　　自12月7日气候变化会议开幕以来，哥本哈根成为各国政府、各种利益集团及一些非政府组织和科研机构博弈的舞台。会场内外，各种观点交锋，无休止的谈判和磋商难以弥合巨大的歧见。随着大会闭幕时间的临近，一种悲观失望的情绪在与会者中蔓延。

　　12月16日下午3时，温家宝总理乘专机从北京飞往哥本哈根。

　　"这是一项艰巨的任务，我代表中国政府出席会议深感责任重大。"在飞机飞行途中，温总理对随行的记者说："在来机场的路上，我想起了两句古话，一是'慎重者，始若怯，终必勇'；二是'思其始而图其终'。这就是说，开始时周密思考，行事时必然英勇果敢。"

　　此前一段时间里，温总理考察了中国气象局，还与部分外国领导人密集通话。事实上，温总理的哥本哈根之行早已"启程"――

　　11月27日至28日，中国、印度、巴西和南非"基础四国"与77国集团主席国苏丹代表在北京举行磋商。温总理会见了与会的各国环境部长或代表。

　　在各政府气候变化代表团在一线艰苦谈判的同时，从12月8日起，温总理分别与联合国秘书长和英国、德国、印度、巴西、南非、丹麦、埃塞俄比亚等国领导人通电话，就会议涉及的一些重大问题坦诚、深入地交换意见。

　　12月11日，温家宝总理考察了中国气象局，并就应对气候变化召开了专家座谈会。他指出，要采取坚决有力措施，实现我国政府提出的减缓温室气体排放的行动目标。

　　哥本哈根气候变化会议开幕后，温总理一直密切关注会议的进展。当专机起飞后，温总理便招呼随行采访的记者到前舱，坦率地谈自己对哥本哈根之行的想法。

　　面对复杂的局势，温总理似乎早已深思熟虑："我坚信，这么多领导人齐聚哥本哈根，应该会取得成果的。但无论会议结局怎样，中国确立的行动方案不会改变，自主减排的目标不容谈判，实现这一目标的决心不会动摇。"

　　空中记者吹风会后，温总理又召集随行的部长们开会研究与会各方观点。当部长们散去后，总理望着舷窗外的云海，目光深邃，陷入沉思。看得出来，总理的心情并不轻松。如何使大会取得成果，有太多的问题需要思考。

　　当地时间16日17时45分，专机降落在哥本哈根机场。寒风呼啸，夹着鹅毛大雪，哥本哈根的冬夜并非那么宁静。

　　此时已接近北京时间凌晨近1时。经过7000多公里、10个小时的飞行，大家已十分疲惫。温总理不顾旅途劳顿，决定从机场直接赶往中国驻丹麦大使馆，听取关于大会的最新情况汇报，研究下一步工作。一个多小时后，温总理才前往下榻的雷迪森饭店。



　　12月18日，中国国务院总理温家宝在哥本哈根出席联合国气候变化大会领导人会议。这是温家宝在会上发表讲话。

　　"最重要的是迅速凝聚共识"――面对错综复杂的形势，温家宝总理以诚意、决心和信心穿梭斡旋，沟通协调，弥合分歧，扩大共识

　　17日早晨6时，温总理来到餐厅吃早餐。他一边吃饭，一边听取有关情况汇报。192个国家之间的谈判，情况瞬息万变。

　　8时30分，温总理精神抖擞地步入会见厅，开始投入当日紧张而密集的会晤中。第一位客人是东道国丹麦首相拉斯穆森。温总理首先肯定了丹麦为筹办会议作出的巨大努力，表示中国将全力支持东道主工作，推动哥本哈根会议取得成果。温总理的话令拉斯穆森感到些许宽慰。他提到，各方分歧巨大，至今还没有一个可供各方磋商的基础草案。话语间流露出对谈判进程的深深忧虑。

　　温总理十分理解东道主的压力，他把各方分歧归结为四个焦点问题，即基础案文、资金、长期目标和"三可"问题，并诚恳地建议采取务实态度，在两个工作组主席已经提出的案文基础上，按照"共同但有区别的责任"原则，把共识部分锁定下来，分歧部分留作以后讨论，这也许是唯一可行的办法。如果能形成这样的决议，也是会议的一个成果。

　　拉斯穆森非常感谢温总理的建设性意见，他说，如果其他领导人都能像中国总理这样积极努力，会议就会取得成果。

　　送走拉斯穆森，迎来了联合国秘书长潘基文。潘基文对会议进程停滞不前也很担忧，认为会议无果而终的结局是不能接受的。温总理说，要让近200个国家在剩下不到两天的时间里，弥合巨大分歧是不现实的。中国和世界人民都期待会议成功，目前最重要的是迅速凝聚共识。可以考虑搞一个反映各方共识的政治性文件，重在明确政治意愿，肯定会议成果，向世界传递信心和希望。

　　温总理特别强调，决议起草和磋商必须公开透明，听取各方意见，尤其要重视发展中国家的关切，希望联合国发挥重要作用。潘基文若有所思地点着头。

　　至此，温总理向东道主和联合国阐明了中国政府对这次会议成果的总体考虑和操作建议。后来发生的事情证明，温总理的意见是富有远见、切实可行的。

　　11时，温家宝总理前往巴西总统卢拉下榻的饭店。此前，卢拉曾提议"基础四国"领导人举行早餐会，但因印度和南非领导人方面存在技术困难而取消。温总理得知这一消息后，主动提出与卢拉总统举行双边会晤。两位老朋友握手拥抱，亲切交谈，一致认为中巴两国在应对气候变化问题上存在广泛共识，要坚定地同其他发展中国家站在一起，维护共同利益，同时与有关各方加强沟通协调，发挥应有的积极作用。

　　时至中午，温总理匆匆返回雷迪森饭店，他要集体会见小岛国代表马尔代夫总统纳希德和格林纳达总理托马斯、非洲国家代表埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯、欠发达国家代表孟加拉国总理哈西娜和77国集团代表苏丹总统助理纳菲阿。

　　中国是发展中国家，历史上同非洲国家、小岛国和欠发达国家有相同或相似的遭遇，双方感情相通、道义相合。温家宝总理与他们围坐一圈，倾心交谈。

　　资金问题是这些国家最关心的问题。某大国代表曾说不会把钱给中国。针对这种说法，温总理表示，中国一直呼吁发达国家切实履行资金承诺，但绝不同其他发展中国家争一分钱的资金，而且将一如既往地在南南合作和双边框架内向欠发达国家提供援助，包括应对气候变化的物质和能力支持。

　　温总理对一些小岛国脆弱的生存环境深表同情，理解他们在全球温控方面的特殊诉求，详细介绍了中国的减排努力和对哥本哈根谈判的考虑。温总理表示，为体现诚意，中国愿意在2050年全球升温不超过2摄氏度问题上照顾小岛国的关切。中国在会议进程中将切实维护所有发展中国家的权益。

　　随后，温总理热情地邀请他们共进午餐。宾主们围坐在饭桌上，边吃边谈。这是温总理在哥本哈根时间最长的一次会见，超过了两个小时。客人们认为，温总理的讲话入情入理，中国为应对气候变化作出了巨大努力，发达国家的指责是不公平的。中国同其他发展中国家一样，应对气候变化不能以牺牲发展为代价。发展中国家应该加强沟通和团结。

　　英国、德国、日本都是发达国家，在发展节能环保、绿色经济等方面具有成熟的技术，希望在推动气候变化国际合作上发挥领导作用，但对发展中国家的国情缺乏了解，提出的一些要求不切实际，有欠公允和平衡。

　　17日下午，温总理先后会见了英国首相布朗、德国总理默克尔和日本首相鸠山由纪夫，就有关问题做了耐心细致的工作。

　　温总理说，哥本哈根会议已到关键时刻，各方不能再继续相互指责，更不能讨价还价，这只会浪费宝贵的时间。要坚持"共同但有区别的责任"原则，从大局出发，迅速凝聚共识，搁置争议，共同为会议取得成果作出努力。

　　温总理强调，中国自主宣布的减缓行动目标不附加任何条件，也不同任何国家的减排目标挂钩，也不容谈判。我们言必信，行必果，一定要实现目标，甚至会做得更好，这符合中国人民和世界人民的利益。中国愿意就增加自主减缓行动的透明度开展磋商与合作，也愿意将全球升温不超过2摄氏度作为努力的方向，这一切体现了中国极大的诚意。

　　温总理强调，发展中国家的主要任务是消除贫困和发展经济，但也不能重走发达国家工业化的老路，不能以牺牲资源和环境为代价；发达国家应给予理解和支持，并在资金和技术问题上履行承诺。发展中国家与发达国家要密切沟通协作，争取会议取得最好结果。

　　虽然在一些问题上双方意见有分歧，但始终进行着坦诚、深入的对话，因为这是增进了解、扩大共识的唯一正确方法。

　　每一场会见都超过了预定时间。温总理在送走布朗后，对久候了的默克尔表示歉意："实在对不起，总理女士，让你久等了。"默克尔风趣地笑着说，刚才布朗从你这里离开时"撞"上我，也说了同样的话。会议室里发出了一阵轻松的笑声。

　　结束了一系列会晤后，温总理立即指示外交部副部长何亚非举行记者会，详细介绍温总理会见各方领导人的情况，讲明在哪些问题上中国是必须坚持的，哪些是愿意灵活处理的。200多名中外记者与会，迅速将中方最新立场和与各方接触情况向世界作了充分报道。中国以实际行动做到了公开和透明。

　　17日晚8时，温家宝总理出席了丹麦女王玛格丽特举行的晚宴，这标志着领导人集体活动日程拉开帷幕。

　　但是，在这个宴会上，发生了一件意想不到的事情。一位外国领导人无意中向温总理提起，某国将在宴会后召开小范围领导人会议，商议新的案文。这位领导人手中的与会国家名单上，赫然写着中国。这引起了温总理的警觉，既然中国也在其列，为何没有接到通知。他从一些相关国家领导人那里得到进一步证实，确有这个会议，但召集方一直未通知中国，十分蹊跷。

　　会议开幕以来，曾发生过个别或少数国家抛出案文，引发各方强烈不满的事件，因为这有悖于公开、透明的原则。温总理感到此事非同小可，立即离席赶回饭店，召开会议研究对策。

　　奉温总理指示，何亚非副部长立即赶到"会场"，对召集方这种别有用心的做法提出强烈不满，表示一定要公开透明，不能搞小圈子，不能强加于人，否则很有可能导致会议无果而终。

　　与此同时，各种传闻和谣言纷至沓来：一些发达国家暗中串通，准备加大力度向中国施压；新兴发展中大国竭力阻挠，很可能导致哥本哈根会议失败；发达国家因不满中国不接受"三可"，拒绝向小岛国提供更多资金；发展中国家阵营正在分裂；某某大国打算独自提出案文等等。种种迹象表明，情况越来越不容乐观。

　　当天夜里，风刮得更紧。各方都在做着最后的准备。



　　12月18日，中国国务院总理温家宝在哥本哈根出席联合国气候变化大会领导人会议。这是温家宝在会上发表讲话。

　　"向世界传递信心和希望"――全世界都在注视着哥本哈根，中国坚定地发出推动人类应对气候变化历史进程的声音和承诺

　　18日8时30分，温总理在出席领导人会议前，与刚刚抵达的印度总理辛格举行会晤。

　　中印是发展中大国，又是邻国。双方能否在关键时刻密切合作，不但关系到发展中国家的利益，也影响到会议的进程。

　　温总理与辛格是老朋友了，这是年内他们第二次见面。两国总理都深刻认识到，只有团结合作，才会有真正和谐、发展、繁荣的亚洲世纪。这需要政治家的高瞻远瞩、胆识和魄力。

　　温总理主动介绍了一天来会议进展的情况，并谈了对会议形势的看法，征求辛格的意见。辛格被温总理的诚挚言行所感动，他表示完全赞同温总理所谈，认为印中在应对气候变化问题上有着广泛共识和共同利益，对两国在推动会议谈判进程上的合作表示满意。两国总理确定，无论出现什么情况，中印都要密切保持沟通和协作，坚定地维护广大发展中国家的利益。

　　位于哥本哈根市南部的贝拉中心，是北欧最大的会展中心。这里是哥本哈根气候大会的主会场。

　　上午9时45分，温总理提前抵达会场，举世瞩目的领导人会议定于10时开幕。然而，时辰已到，东道主和联合国秘书长却踪影全无，主席台上空空如也。人们纷纷猜测到底发生了什么事情，但始终没有任何人出来说明。

　　一些外国领导人纷纷前来同温总理打招呼，温总理与他们友好地寒暄。时间一分一分地流逝，消磨着人们的热情和期待。

　　见此情形，温总理当机立断，提议"基础四国"领导人再次碰头。这时，工作人员已经来不及安排会议室了，四国领导人就在会场外的大厅里，围坐在一张茶几旁交换看法，决心在最后一刻努力争取会议有个成果。

　　时针指向11时30分，会议主席拉斯穆森终于宣布会议开始。拉斯穆森请温总理第一个发言。在掌声中，温总理健步走上讲台，表情从容、淡定、坚毅。他发表了题为《凝聚共识加强合作推进应对气候变化历史进程》的演讲，通篇只有2000多字，但是内容丰富、立意高远、充满感情。

　　"此时此刻，全世界几十亿人都在注视着哥本哈根。我们在此表达的意愿和做出的承诺，应当有利于推动人类应对气候变化的历史进程。站在这个讲坛上，我深感责任重大。"温总理的开场白道出了世界人民的心声，表达了中国政府高度负责的态度。温总理接着介绍了中国应对气候变化作出的贡献，提出了推进气候谈判的"四项主张"。最后，温总理提高了嗓音，向世界承诺："中国政府确定减缓温室气体排放的目标是中国根据国情采取的自主行动，是对中国人民和全人类负责的，不附加任何条件，不与任何国家的减排目标挂钩。我们言必信、行必果，无论本次会议达成什么成果，都将坚定不移地为实现、甚至超过这个目标而努力。"

　　温总理提出的上述主张反映了广大发展中国家的共同诉求，合情合理，既立足当前，又面向未来，同时兼顾各方，在会议面临何去何从的关键时刻，指明了方向，有力地维护和推进了谈判进程，赢得广泛赞同。

　　温总理的演讲赢得了会场内长时间的掌声。一些国家领导人主动起身，与温总理握手表示祝贺。

　　"有1%的希望就要尽100%的努力"――在会议面临可能无果而终的关键时刻，中国政府以卓有成效的努力推动了《哥本哈根协议》的达成

　　中国是最大的发展中国家，美国是最大的发达国家。两国领导人的会晤自然成为各界关注的焦点。

　　温总理与奥巴马的会晤安排在奥巴马的发言结束后，在会场后面一个用帷幕和钢架搭成的简易会议室里举行。

　　两国领导人就应对气候变化会议成果、长期目标、"三可"等焦点问题坦诚、深入、务实地交换意见，双方都表达了各自的观点，但同时表现出一定的灵活性。双方赞同大会要尽快达成一项政治协议，并保持合作。随后，两国领导人指示各自谈判代表进一步进行磋商，并约定当天晚些时候再次见面。

　　在与奥巴马会晤后，温总理立即指示中方谈判代表将中美会晤情况向"基础四国"和77国集团通报，推动发展中国家同发达国家一道，加快谈判进程。

　　此后，发达国家和发展中国家就会议最后文件进行磋商，但由于各方意见分歧，谈判难以取得进展。此时，已经大大超过了会议原定的闭幕时间。

　　这时，有的国家甚至准备了会议一旦失败的声明。少数国家领导人甚至发表了不负责任的言论，指责中国。

　　在贝拉中心，可以看到许多领导人行色匆匆，面色凝重。各记者开始收拾装备，地上随处可见丢弃的纸张。此时，人们更加关心丹麦政府将在什么时候，以什么方式，宣布这场联合国历史上规模最大、级别最高的峰会以失败告终。

　　在最后关头，温家宝总理再次发挥了关键作用。他召开中国代表团会议，冷静地分析形势，认为此时已不可能达成一份具有法律约束力的文件，但各方都清楚大会无果而终意味着什么，谁都不愿承担导致失败的责任。温总理说，只要有1%的希望，就要尽100%的努力，不能轻言放弃。他立即决定，约卢拉、辛格、祖马再次会晤，作最后的努力。此时，奥巴马也提出约温总理进行第二次会晤。温总理答应，在"基础四国"领异人会晤后，即同奥马会晤。

　　不一会，四国领导人先后来到中国代表团安排的会场。人家一致认为，现在会议有失败的危险。四国可先就关键问题形成共识，在坚持原则、维护发展中国家利益基础上，以最大的灵活性，再同美欧去谈，要尽一切努力争取会议有所成果。温家宝总理特别强调，要与非洲国家、77国集团、小岛国保持沟通，加强合作。

　　18时50分，"基础四国"领导人正在最后梳理共同立场，会场门外一阵骚动，美国总统奥巴马推开大门走了进来。虽然中美双方约定会晤的时间已过，但奥巴马此时此地出现，还是让大家感到意外。

　　奥巴马也感到有些唐突，一只脚跨入门内一只脚还在门外，他笑着问：温总理，我是不是来得早了一点，我是先到外面等着，还是进来加入你们一起讨论？温总理站起身来，礼貌地表示欢迎他"加入"。奥巴马颇为感动，他先绕会场一周，与所有的人一一握手。然后在卢拉的左边、温总理的对面坐下。

　　由于"基础四国"此前都分别同美方有过接触，彼此的立场已经很清楚了。温总理首先表示要努力争取会议通过一个决议，以肯定成果，凝聚共识。然后，就几个关键问题向奥巴马阐述了四国的立场。奥巴马也向四国介绍了美国的最新立场。奥巴马表示，双方在这几个问题上的措辞已经很接近了。接着，五国领导人继续进行严肃认真的磋商。

　　门外的记者们一直在注视着场内的情景，有的隔着玻璃在拍摄。不久场内传出一阵掌声，经过磋商，"基础四国"就协议表述的几个重要问题同美国达成一致。美方表示愿意出面征求欧盟方面的意见。

　　随后，美国和欧盟国家进行了磋商，"基础四国"也跟有关国家进行了磋商。然后，这个草案又在部分国家中进行了小范围磋商。

　　一个小时后传来消息，有关各方已经就一份决议案文达成一致，将马上提交大会表决。这时，离原定大会闭幕时间过去了9个小时。

　　因为接下来的是程序性工作，各国领导人纷纷飞离哥本哈根，他们已经超额完成了出席领导人会议的任务。

　　哥本哈根气候大会最后的结果，决不是由一个国家或两个国家说了算的，这是与会各国共同努力的结果。但是，从这些曲折而艰难的会议进程中，可以看出中国发挥了关键性作用。

　　近几天来，虽然一些国际媒体对哥本哈根会议的成果存在不同的解读，但有一点是肯定的，那就是：在国际社会的共同努力下，应对气候变化国际合作朝着正确的方向又前进了一步，向世界传递了信心和希望。中国为此表现出了最大的诚意，尽了最大的努力，发挥了重要的建设性作用。

　　近日，温总理在接受新华社记者采访时说，中国愿意同各方一道，以哥本哈根会议为新的起点，加强履行承诺，加强合作，尽早完成"巴厘路线图"谈判，推动气候变化国际合作不断取得新进展，为人类应对气候变化作出应有贡献。

　　历史又一次证明，人类最大的挑战是人类自己。团结才有力量，合作才有前途。哥本哈根会议使中国登上了更高、更广阔的世界舞台，中国有理由骄傲，中国一定会更加努力！

青山遮不住，毕竟东流去。哥本哈根会议是一个新的起点，从这里出发，国际社会应对气候变化的进程将不断向前。